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Abstract
This Note examines whether the structure of Regulation S has caused increased flowback of
unregistered securities into the United States. Part I discusses the development of the offshore
capital markets and the registration requirements of the Securities Act. Part I also details the
evolution of the SEC’s application of the Securities Act registration requirements to international
securities sales, and summarizes Regulation S. Part II discusses the benefits to issuers of using
Regulation S, and the effect that Regulation S has had on U.S. corporate participation in the off-
shore markets. Part II also analyzes the threat that flowback poses to the Securities Act disclosure
requirements, and examines the mechanisms through which unregistered securities flow back into
the United States. Part III argues that neither SEC enforcement efforts, nor the currently extant
private remedy, can effectively curtail the flowback problem caused by Regulation S. In addition,
Part III provides recommendations for amending Regulation S to ensure greater protection for
U.S. investors and greater certainty for U.S. issuers in offshore transactions. This Note concludes
that the SEC should revisit Regulation S in order achieve a workable balance between access for
issuers and protection for investors.
NOTES
EVASION AND FLOWBACK IN THE REGULATION S ERA:
STRENGTHENING U.S. INVESTOR PROTECTION




The 1980's was a period of explosive growth in the interna-
tionalization of the securities markets.1 The value of all securi-
ties issued outside of issuers' home markets in 1989 was six times
that of 1980.2 Despite this growth, the Securities and Exchange
Commission's ("SEC" or "Commission") aggressive position re-
garding the extraterritorial application of the Securities Act of
19331 ("Securities Act") continued to limit U.S. corporations'
ability to compete with non-U.S. corporations4 for investment
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University. Special thanks to Professor Steve
Thel of Fordhasn University School of Law for his invaluable guidance.
1. See CzARL.EsJ. JOHNSON, JR., CORPoATE FnANcE AND THE SECURTES LAws 457-
61 (1990). Securities markets are exchanges through which debt and equity securities
are traded by investors. See RicHARD W.JENNrnrs Er A..., SECURTIES REGULATON: CASES
AND MATERiAs 1-27 (7th ed. 1992) (discussing overview of securities markets). The
internationalization of the securities markets consists of the issuance and trading of
securities between issuers and investors in different countries. See D.E. An.LoG, THE
INTERNATIONA11SATION OF STOCKvmrS 3-5 (1986) (discussing internationalization of
the capital markets).
2. See HAZEL J. JOHNSON, THE NEw GLOBAL BANxER 91-104 (1994) [hereinafter
GLOBAL BANKER]. International bond issues grew from US$40 billion in 1980 to over
US$250 billion in 1989. Id. at 94 (Exhibit 3-4). International equity issuance grew
from practically nothing in 1984 to over US$18 billion in 1987. Id. at 103 (Exhibit 3-8).
3. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Securi-
ties Act of 1933 was passed during President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's first 100 days
in office. See EDWARD T. McCoRmicx, UNDERsTANDNGo THE SECURITIES Aar AND THE
SEC 20-24 (1948) (discussing history of Securities Act). The purpose of the Securities
Act is to ensure full disclosure in the registration statement and prospectus for new
securities. SAiusJ. KHousy, THE DEREcULATION OF THE WORLD FrNANcLAL MA~uzm 70
(1990).
4. See Samuel Wolff, Offshore Disfributios Under the Secuities Act of1933: An Analysis
of Regulation S, 23 LAw & POL'Y INr'L Bus. 101, 112-16 (1991/92) (discussing dissatisfac-
tion of U.S. market participants with SEC regulation of offshore capital markets prior to
1990). Preparation of a registration statement that complies with the Securities Act
requirements costs hundreds of thousands of dollars. Don Berger, Offshore Distributions
of Securities: The Impact of Regulation S, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. 575, 578 (1990).
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from the offshore markets. 5 To remedy this problem, on April
30, 1990, as part of a relaxation of the Securities Act registration
requirements, 6 the SEC adopted Regulation S.7
Regulation S provides a standard set of rules that may be
followed by offshore issuers8 and purchasers of unregistered cor-
porate securities9 to ensure that their offshore transactions need
not be registered under the Securities Act.1" As a result, Regula-
tion S has made offshore issuance of unregistered securities by
U.S. corporations less expensive and easier than it was prior to
1990.11 Although Regulation S was designed to allow greater ac-
cess to offshore funding for U.S. issuers, 12 in promulgating the
5. See JoHN F. MARsnAT & M.E. ELus, I, N.s-mr BANcKIN & BROKERAGE 78-79
(1994) (discussing offshore markets). The offshore markets are a set of virtually unreg-
ulated extraterritorial securities markets that facilitate issuance and trading of securities
across national borders. I& at 79. The offshore capital markets originally developed in
Europe and are often called the Euromarkets. SeeJoHNsoN, supra note 1, at 461. Off-
shore equity securities are often called Euroequities. Id. at 457. Offshore debt securi-
ties are either called Eurobonds or foreign bonds. See AY.NG, supra note 1, at 97-98.
6. See Fred A. Little, Regulation SAnd Rule 144A, C895 ALI-ABA 445, 447-49 (1994)
(discussing two regulations adopted in Spring of 1990 to improve U.S. corporate access
to offshore markets). Along with Regulation S, the SEC also promulgated Rule 144A,
which provides an exemption from registration for private placements of new securities
made to sophisticated institutional investors. Rule 144A - Private Resales to Institu-
tions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1994).
7. Regulation S-Rules Governing Offers and Sales Made Outside of the United
States Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-
230.904 (1994).
8. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(4). The Securities Act defines issuer in part as "every
person who issues or proposes to issue any security." Id.
9. Id. § 5. Section 5 of the Securities Act requires all issuers to file registration
statements with the SEC prior to the offer or sale of any security. Id. Various provisions
of the Securities Act grant authority to the SEC to exempt certain types of securities and
interpret existing statutory exemptions. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b)-(c).
10. SeeJohn R. Coogan & Thomas C. Kimbrough, Regulation S Safe Harbors For Off-
shore Offers, Sals And Resales, INsiG;rrs, Aug. 1990, at 3. The primary benefit for issuers
will be greater certainty in planning offshore transactions. Id. at 3. Prior to the adop-
tion of Regulation S, issuers were forced to rely on a complex amalgam of SEC releases,
no-action letters and private conversations with SEC officials to plan offshore transac-
tions. John M. Allen, Jr. & Lee M. Weinberg, Wen A Regulation S Offering Makes Sense,
INT' FiN. L. REv., Aug. 1993, at 39.
11. See Kevin Kelley & Alan Bannister, US Investors and Offshore Offerings,
EuioMoNE, April 1993, at 166 (discussing benefits to issuer of Regulation S).
12. See Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, 55 Fed. Reg.
18,306, 18,321 (May 2, 1990) (discussing cost-benefit analysis of Regulation S) [herein-
after Adopting Release]. In the Regulation S Adopting Release, the SEC stated as fol-
lows:
It appears to the Commission that, while it is possible that some additional
costs to issuers, distributors or other sellers may result from structuring a trans-
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rules, the SEC had to comply with its mandate to protect U.S.
investors from public offers and sales of unregistered securi-
ties.'3 The SEC, therefore, imposed a variety of restrictions on
offshore issuers and their distributors in order to prevent the
resale into the United States of unregistered corporate securities
initially sold to offshore investors pursuant to Regulation S.14
This return of unregistered offshore securities has been termed
flowback. 15
In the four years since Regulation S took effect, it has
helped to open up the offshore markets for U.S. issuers.16
Counter to the SEC's expectations, 17 however, during the same
period, flowback has increased significantly.' 8 Some of this
flowback has occurred because issuers and offshore investors
have intentionally used Regulation S to avoid the Securities Act
registration requirements, an act that the SEC considers illegal.' 9
action in accordance with the requirements of [Regulation S], such costs will
be outweighed by the savings of the costs of registration and the benefit de-
rived from assurance that registration need not be undertaken. In addition,
the Commission believes that the streamlined method to assure that securities
come to rest outside the United States will also reduce costs.
Id.
13. See S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) (discussing philosophy of
Securities Act). The SEC explicitly recognizes its duty to protect investors purchasing
on the U.S. securities markets in the Adopting Release. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg.
18,306, 18,308.
14. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,313. The SEC has stated that "the
criteria used to divide securities into three groups... were chosen because they reflect
the likelihood of flowback into the United States and the degree of information avail-
able to U.S. investors regarding such securities." See id. (detailing: three basic proposi-
tions underlying Regulation S).
15. Proposed Rules: Offshore Offers and Sales, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,661, 22,665 (June
17, 1988) [hereinafter Proposed Rules]. The SEC defines flowback as an indirect distri-
bution in the U.S. markets of unregistered securities initially sold offshore. Id.
16. See Kelley, supra note 11, at 166. Regulation S has reduced the uncertainty and
procedural requirements that existed prior to the adoption of the regulation by the
SEC. Id. In addition, Regulation S has increased the ability of offshore offerings to
reach certain U.S. investors without registration. I&
17. See Proposed Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,661, 22,665 (discussing SEC position that
rules of Regulation S must ensure against indirect distribution in U.S. markets).
18. See Laurie P. Cohen, Rule Permitting Offshore Stock Sals Yields Deals That Spark
SEC Concerns, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1994, at CI (discussing flowback after adoption of
Regulation S). SEC officials believe that the rule has resulted in many illegal transac-
tions. Id. It has also opened the door for con artists to swindle small U.S. issuers. John
R. Emshwiller, Need For Money Pulls Young Firms Into Risky Deals, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31,
1992, at B2.
19. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-230.904, prelim. n.2 (1994) (prohibiting use of Regu-
lation S as part of a scheme to avoid Securities Act registration requirements).
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The rest of the transactions that have led to flowback have com-
ported with the terms of Regulation S, but not with the SEC's
goal to encourage long-term investment in U.S. corporations by
offshore purchasers." Regardless of whether the flowback is
valid or invalid, any flowback threatens the disclosure scheme
created by the Securities Act and, consequently, the ability of the
SEC to protect U.S. investors.2 1
This Note examines whether the structure of Regulation S
has caused increased flowback of unregistered securities into the
United States. Part I discusses the development of the offshore
capital markets and the registration requirements of the Securi-
ties Act. Part I also details the evolution of the SEC's application
of the Securities Act registration requirements to international
securities sales, and summarizes Regulation S. Part II discusses
the benefits to issuers of using Regulation S, and the effect that
Regulation S has had on U.S. corporate participation in the off-
shore markets. Part II also analyzes the threat that flowback
poses to the Securities Act disclosure requirements, and exam-
ines the mechanisms through which unregistered securities flow
back into the United States. Part III argues that neither SEC
enforcement efforts, nor the currently extant private remedy,
can effectively curtail the flowback problem caused by Regula-
tion S. In addition, Part III provides recommendations for
amending Regulation S to ensure greater protection for U.S. in-
vestors and greater certainty for U.S. issuers in offshore transac-
tions. This Note concludes that the SEC should revisit Regula-
tion S in order achieve a workable balance between access for
issuers and protection for investors.
I. THE OFFSHORE APPLICATION OF THE SECURITIES ACT
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS
In response to increased U.S. corporate activity in the inter-
national securities markets over the last several decades, 22 the
SEC has, on several occasions, reexamined its position regarding
20. See Cohen, supra note 18, at Cl (discussing flowback since adoption of Regula-
tion S).
21. See H.R. Doc. No. 12, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1933) (discussing underlying
purposes of Securities Act).
22. Proposed Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,661, 22,665. The SEC stated that a new ap-
proach to the offshore application of the Securities Act registration requirements was
necessary because of the development of active international trading markets, a large
80919951
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the extent to which the registration requirements of the Securi-
ties Act apply to offshore securities transactions involving U.S.
corporations and investors. 23 Since 1933,-the SEC has consist-
ently held that offshore offers and sales of securities that have no
domestic impact24 need not be registered under the Securities
Act.2  The SEC has derived this view from its determination that
the Securities Act registration requirements are not meant to
protect overseas investors. 6 The Commission, however, did not
adopt a standard set of guidelines that U.S. corporations could
follow to ensure that their offshore offerings remained outside
of the reach of the Securities Act registration requirements until
1990, when it adopted Regulation S.27
A. The Offshore Securities Markets
Over the last two decades securities markets throughout the
world have become increasingly interconnected.2 8 This global-
ization has been due to a combination of rapid growth in the
world economy and substantial improvements in computer and
financial technology.2 9 Investment banks 0 that participate in
increase in offshore offerings, and significant involvement by U.S. investors in the inter-
national markets. Id.
23. Id. For corporations that seek to raise capital in the offshore markets, the most
important question is the scope of the extraterritorial reach of the Securities Act regis-
tration requirements. Id.
24. See Wolff, supra note 4, at 108-09. The SEC interpreted "no domestic impact"
to mean that securities sold by U.S. corporations through an offihore primary offering
must be distributed abroad solely to non-U.S. persons in such a way as to ensure that
they would not be redistributed into the United States by offshore purchasers without a
valid exemption from registration. Id.
25. See Berger, supra note 4, at 577-81 (discussing SEC's historical approach to
offshore application of Securities Act registration requirements).
26. See Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers; Registration of Un-
derwriters of Foreign Offerings as Broker-Dealers, Securities Act Release No. 4708, 1964
WL 3661, *1 (SEC) July 9,1964) (discussing SEC position that offhore securities sales
that have no domestic impact are exempt from registration).
27. See Allen & Weinberg, supra note 10, at 39 (discussing how Regulation S clari-
fies extraterritorial application of Securities Act registration requirements).
28. See A&'.ING, supra note 1, at 1-22 (discussing internationalization of securities
markets).
29. SeeJoHNsoN, supra note 1, at 458-59 (discussing factors underlying intemation-
alization of securities markets); see also AyiiNr, supra note 1, at 43-57 (discussing histori-
cal overview of internationalization of securities markets).
30. See MAmSHALL & ELUs, supra note 5, at 4-6 (discussing definition of investment
banking). The Glass-Steagall Act, enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1933, split the U.S.
banking industry into two parts: commercial and investment banking. Banking (Glass-
Steagall) Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered
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various facets of offshore distribution have adapted the tech-
niques of domestic securities issuance to the international mar-
kets.3l
1. The Rise and Growth of the International Capital Markets
During the years surrounding World War 11,32 U.S. industry
supported its growth almost exclusively through the domestic se-
curities markets."3 Beginning in the late 1950's, however, U.S.
corporations began a period of rapid expansion into overseas
markets.3 4 In the 1960's, the U.S. government passed a series of
laws that placed significant limitations on the ability of multina-
tional corporations to use investment capital raised in the
United States for offshore projects.35 These restrictions forced
U.S. corporations to begin to use the offshore securities markets
to satisfy their demand for capital.36 The demise of the Bretton
Woods regime 7 in March 1973,8 which resulted in the adoption
sections of 12 U.S.C.). Glass-Steagall states that only commercial banks can take depos-
its and directly lend money to corporations. MARSHALL & ELLIS, supra note 5, at 4.
Glass-Steagall declares that only investment banks can underwrite securities, take posi-
tions for their own accounts in certain types of securities, or act as agents for others in
securities transactions. Id.
31. See AYV-No, supra note 1, at 102 (discussing offshore issuance procedures).
32. See CONCISE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 930 (Judith S. Levey & Agnes Greenhall
eds., 1983) [hereinafter COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA] (discussing World War II). World
War II commenced in 1935 and ended in 1945. Id.
33. Wolff, supra note 4, at 108-09. Few international offerings were made during
the first few decades after the Securities Act was enacted. Id.
34. SeeJoHNsoN, supra note 1, at 461. During the 1950's, the strength of the dollar
forced U.S. companies to invest heavily in overseas manufacturing plants in order to
remain competitive. Id.
35. GLOBAL BANKER, supra note 2, at 87.
36. SeeJoHNsoN, supra note 1, at 462 (discussing increase in U.S. corporate use of
offshore funding). Between 1971 and 1978 U.S. corporations led all countries, except
Canada, in international bond ("Eurobond") issuance. See DAvD F. LomAX & P.T.G.
GuTmsN, THE EuRomAwmS Am INTENATIOtAL FIANCIAL Poucirs 9 (Table 1.9)
(1981) (discussing new international bond issues by country from 1971 to 1978).
37. See BARRv EXCHENGREEN & PrrER B. KxzNEN, Managing the World Economy under the
Bretton Woods System An Ovenview, in MANAGING Tm WORLD ECONOMY. Fir YEARS Ar-
T BRErON WOODS 3, 11-15 (1994). The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, held in
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, led to the introduction of a fixed exchange rate sys-
tem pegged to the U.S. dollar. Id. at 13. At the meeting, the allied industrialized na-
tions agreed to create the International Monetary Fund to deal with future balance of
payments problems, as well as currency stabilization. Id. The conferees also agreed to
develop the World Bank, also called the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, to provide international financial assistance to the developing countries
of the world. Id. at 14; see ARMAuN VAN DoRMAEL, BRErrON WOODS: BIRTH OF A MON-
TARY SYSTEM (1978) (discussing history of Bretton Woods Accords).
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of a floating exchange-rate system, 9 and the accumulation of pe-
trodollars4 ° by the member states of the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries ("OPEC"),4 provided the sparks for
the explosion of the international securities markets. 42 By the
end of the 1980's, the offshore capital markets had become an
important source of both domestic and global project financing
for public companies worldwide.43
Although the tremendous growth of the world economy
since World War I144 has been the primary impetus for the
globalization of the securities markets, significant advances in
38. See AyLuNc, sup-a note 1, at 50-51 (discussing demise of Bretton Woods ac-
cord).
39. See AyvuIc, supra note 1, at 19 (discussing relationship between international
currency markets and international securities markets). A floating exchange rate sys-
tem is one in which currencies are not pegged to the price of gold or some other
commodity, but rather float against one another based on the international currency
market's beliefs about the relative strengths of the economies of each participating na-
tion. See RcmD S. THORN, INTRODUCTrON TO MONEY AM BANVING 510-22 (1976) (dis-
cussing various types of currency exchange systems). The system that replaced the Bret-
ton Woods regime is, in reality, a number of multi-lateral arrangements that allow coun-
tries to have either floating, fixed or managed exchange rates. AvuuG, supra note 1, at
51-52. The increased control over monetary policy won by the governments of the in-
dustrialized world after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system came at the expense
of certainty for business. Id. at 52. Once the industrialized countries switched to float-
ing rates, however, the financial markets quickly developed a variety of new services to
assist international market participants. Id.
40. AYLING, supra note 1, at 52-53. The oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 led to a drastic
increase in the price of oil, and a commensurate rise in the amount of capital in the
hands of the OPEC countries. IR This newfound capital flowed into the United States
where it was invested and came to be known as Petrodollars. Id.
41. See COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 32, at 628. In 1973, OPEC consisted of
the following member states: Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. Id.
42. See AYuuo, supra note 1, at 19-21 (discussing importance of foreign exchange
markets in scheme of international finance). The floating exchange rate regime pro-
vided the liquidity necessary for large-scale international investment Id. at 21. Pe-
trodollars provided the necessary investment capital. SeeJomNsoN, supra note 1, at 462
(discussing how petrodollars led to growth of Euromarkets). The explosion of the in-
ternational securities markets is demonstrated by the fact that although new interna-
tional bond offerings totaled only US$24.9 billion in 1978, of which US$3 billion had
been issued by U.S. public and private institutions, Lor.Ax & GuTmANN, supra note 36,
at 9 (Table 1.9), by 1986 new international bond issues had reached US$227.1 billion
worldwide, and by 1991 they totaled almost US$300 billion. MoPuus GOLDSIN Er AL,
INTERNATIONAL CAPrrAL MARKErs 35 (Table 6) (1992).
43. SeeJOHNSON, supra note 1, at 457-59 (discussing growth in use of offshore mar-
kets by corporations).
44. I4 at 459. The industrialized nations 4eveloped large trade surpluses that fi-
nanced investment throughout the globe. Id.
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market technology, as well as the growing sophistication of cor-
porate financiers, have provided the tools necessary to make in-
ternational issuance and trading a reality.4" The development of
financial engineering46 and sophisticated derivatives 7 has ena-
bled multinational corporations to hedge4" against fluctuations
in currencies and interest rates. 49 The creation of automated
clearance and settlement facilities,"0 improvements in world-
wide secondary markets,51 and advances in telecommunications
and computer technology has made transactions easier and
trades instantaneous." Over the last decade, the increasing
dominance of institutional investors53 has also played a impor-
tant role, as those organizations have sought new investment op-
portunities.5 4 Today, large U.S. corporations must access off-
shore sources of investment to minimize their firm's cost of capi-
tal.55
2. Offshore Issuance Procedures
Like the domestic securities markets, two types of securities
are offered and sold on the international securities markets -
debt, which can be either Eurobonds5 6 or foreign bonds,-7 and
45. Id.
46. See MARSH.L. & Exis, supra note 5, at 9. Financial engineering is the develop-
ment and use of innovative financial products to solve financial problems, gain oppor-
tunities, and add value to a deal. Id.
47. See ROBERT W. HAMMTON, MONEY MANAGEMENT FOR LAWYERS AND CUENTS: ES-
SENTIAL CONCEMTS AND APPLICATIONS 521-22 (1993). Derivatives are securities, such as
options, swaps, and index futures, that derive their value from the underlying value of
other securities, such as stocks, or commodities. Id.
48. Id. at 528. An investor hedges his or her position by undertaking a transaction
that protects an existing holding from adverse price movements. Id.; see Zvi BODIE Er
A.., INvESTMENTS 833-53 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing methods of hedging).
49. See MuSHL AND Euis, supra note 4, at 227 (discussing reasons why deriva-
tives are used).
50. Id. at 287-94. The clearing of trades is the process by which payment is col-
lected from the buyer of securities and transferred to the purchaser of securities, and
securities are delivered from the seller to the buyer. Id. at 287.
51. See HAmLTON, supra note 47, at 545. A secondary market is a market in which
investors who own securities can sell them to purchasers.. Id.
52. SeeJOHNSON, supra note 1, at 458 (discussing non-economic factors that influ-
enced growth of offshore markets).
53. See HAI mLTON, supra note 47, at 530. Institutional investors are large organiza-
tions that invest other people's money, such as pension or mutual funds. Id.
54. SeeJoHtsoN, supra note 1, at 458-59.
55. See Euan Hagger, Issuing Abroad Is A Risky Venture, CORP. FIN., Nov. 1993, at 22
(discussing benefits to corporations of using offshore funding).
56. MARsHAmL & ELus, supra note 5, at 79. Eurobonds are various types of debt
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equity ("Euroequity"). 58 During the 1960's and 1970's, debt in-
struments were the primary tools of offshore finance.59 During
the 1980's a global Euroequity market was created.60
The offshore markets work in the same manner as the do-
mestic markets, except that they operate on a wider scale.6 Ini-
tially, a corporation that is interested in raising capital from off-
shore investors will approach a major investment bank6 2 for ad-
vice on how to most effectively market its securities to
international investors.63 Sometimes, however, an offshore offer-
ing will get its start when an investment bank approaches a com-
pany with a detailed proposal to raise capital for the firm outside
of the United States.' If the advising bank concludes that an
offshore offering 65 is feasible, it, or another investment bank,
will become the lead manager 66 of the offering.67 Once the lead
instruments sold on multiple non-domestic markets. GLOBAL BANKmR, sup a note 2, at
91. They may be denominated in any currency, but are usually denominated in U.S.
dollars ("Yankee Bonds"), Japanese yen ("Samurai Bonds"), or British pounds ("Bull-
dog Bonds"). MARSHALL & ELus, supra note 5, at 79.
57. MAnSHAaL & ELuS, supra note 5, at 79. Foreign bonds are debt instruments
sold in a single offshore market. Id.
58. See TonBENJuu. ANDERSON, EUROmAju~r MIRUmENTS 209-63 (1990) (discuss-
ing international equity related issues). Euroequities are stocks placed and traded in
nations outside the issuer's home country. I&. at 209. An international stock is one thatis traded on several different markets. Hms SToLL, The Shape of World Equiy Markets, in
INTERNATIONAL FInANCE & FinAciAL Poucy 225 (Hans Stoll ed., 1990).
59. Proposed Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,661, 22,664 (June 17, 1988) (discussing
changes in offshore capital markets over preceeding three decades). In 1983 the
Euroequity market was almost non-existent. Id.
60. See GoLsrmn, supra note 42, at 35 (discussing expansion of Euroequity nar-
ket in late 1980's and early 1990's). In the first half of 1991, international primary
offerings of ordinary shares totalled nearly US$15 billion. IM at 64 (Table A17). Off-
shore issues of convertible bonds, which can be exchanged for stock in the issuing com-
pany upon the happening of a specific event, and bonds with equity warrants, which
provide special certificates that the holder can exchange for stock, in addition to the
standard rights conferred by the bond, accounted for an additional US$24 billion. Id.
61. See AYuNG, supra note 1, at 102. Although this procedure describes Eurobond
issuance, the procedures used for issuing Euroequity are very similar. See ANDERSON,
supra note 58, at 219-20 (discussing application of Eurobond syndication techniques to
Euroequity issuance).
62. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing definition of investment
bank).
63. See AYLrNG, supra note 1, at 102-03 (discussing Eurobond syndication tech-
niques).
64. Id.
65. See MARsHALL & Ewus, supra note 5, at 78-79. An offshore offering is a primary
offering to investors outside of the United States. Id.
66. See MASH.L & ELus, supra note 5, at 64. The lead manager or lead under-
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manager and the issuer have determined how they will structure
the securities to be sold, the lead manager will seek out other
investment banks ("co-underwriters" and "managers") to aid in
the underwriting and distribution of the securities to individual
and institutional investors.68 The co-underwriters or managers
receive a fee for their participation, along with a spread between
the price they pay for the stock and the public offering price.69
In return, they not only agree to distribute the securities to off-
shore investors, but also to enlist smaller local firms, called sell-
ing agents, to aid in the distribution.7" Past multinational and
global distributions have included more than ten managers and
dozens of distributors.7' These participants, along with the issu-
ing corporation, are known as the issuing group.72
B. The Purpose and Requirements of the Securities Act and the
Sanctions that May Be Imposed for Failure to Register
Approximately half of the US$50 billion of new issues of se-
curities 73 sold to the U.S. investing public during the boom mar-
writer is the investment banking firm that manages the underwriting syndicate in a
public offering. Id.
67. AoUNO, supra note 1, at 103.
68. Id. at 103. The managers become the underwriters' principals and agree to
purchase the remainder of an issue in the event they are unable to sell all of the securi-
ties that have been issued. Id.
69. Id. The lead underwriter, acting as the issuer's agent, generally negotiates the
fee arrangements with the other members of the underwriting syndicate. Id.
70. Id. The lead manager, in conjunction with the selling agents, develops a sell-
ing prospectus, containing financial and other business information about the issuer
that is given to potential purchasers. Id. The selling agents publish advertisements,
called tombstones, in local financial journals and newspapers, announcing the salient
information regarding the securities offering in order to attract investors in their re-
spective markets. Id.
71. Id.
72. Wolff, supra note 4, at 141. The "issuing group" includes the issuer, distribu-
tors, affiliates thereof, and their agents. Id.
73. SeeJennings, supra note 1, at 264-317 (discussing what constitutes a security);
see also Securities & Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (discuss-
ing Howey test for determining whether a purchase agreement constitutes an invest-
ment contract, and, therefore, a security); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Kos-
cot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (1974) (holding that rights in pyramid scheme
are securities); International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America v. Daniel, 49 U.S. 551 (1979) (holding that non-contributory,
cumpulsory pension plans are securities); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S.
681 (1985) (holding that stock is security under Securities Act regardless of whether
entire company is sold to one purchaser); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990)
(holding that certain demand notes issued by a farmer's cooperative are securities).
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ket of the 1920's later proved to be worthless.74 After the crash
of the U.S. stock markets in 1929,"' the U.S. Congress came to
believe that unscrupulous securities underwriters7 6 and dealers"
had perpetrated a massive fraud on the investing public. 8
Franklin D. Roosevelt, following his inauguration as President of
the United States, proposed that the U.S. Congress pass legisla-
tion regulating the offer and sale of securities on the U.S. public
markets.7I The Securities Act of 1933 was the result."
The Securities Act demands that issuers of corporate securi-
ties make full disclosure of material facts related to a primary
offering81 unless the offering qualifies for an exemption from
registration.8 2 The goal of the act is to protect unsophisticated
For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to define security to include notes, stocks,
bonds, and debentures. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1) (discussing statutory defini-
tion of security).
74. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933) (discussing fraudulent prac-
tinces in U.S. stock markets during years between World War I and Great Depression).
75. See generally BAR=E A. WIOMORE, THE CRASH & ITS AFERMATH: A HISTORY OF
SECURITIES MARKTs IN THE UNrTw STATES, 1929-33 (1985).
76. See MARSHALL & ELus, supra note 5, at 57-86 (discussing the definition of un-
derwriter and underwriting process). Underwriters have three primary tasks. Id. at 57.
First, they originate deals. Id. Origination consists of the development of the terms
and registration of a securities offering. Id. Second, they underwrite securities. Id.
Underwriting is the purchase of securities from an issuer, for sale to the public. Id.
Finally, they distribute, or sell, the securities to the public. I&
77. Id at 108-09. A dealer buys and sells securities as a principal, and makes his or
her money from the spread between what he or she pays for the securities and the price
at which he or she sells those securities. I&
78. See H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). The congressional report
reads in pertinent part as follows:
The flotation of such a mass of essentially fraudulent securities was made pos-
sible because of the complete abandonment by many underwriters and dealers
in securities of those standards of fair, honest, and prudent dealing that
should be basic to the encouragement of investment in any enterprise. Allur-
ing promises of easy wealth were made with little or no attempt to bring to the
investors attention those facts essential to estimating the worth of any security.
Id. at 2.
79. See H.R. Doc. No. 12, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) [hereinafter MESSAcE FROM
THE PRESIMENT OF THE UNITED STATE-S] (discussing underlying purposes of Securities
Act).
80. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77z (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
81. Id. § 5. Section 5 makes it unlawful for any person to use the means of inter-
state commerce to sell, or offer to sell, non-exempt, unregistered securities. Id.
82. Id. § 4. The two most important statutory exemptions for the purpose of this
Note state as follows:
The provisions of section 5 shall not apply to-
(1) transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or
dealer.
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U.S. investors from being misled by issuers, distributors, and
dealers of securities."3 It attempts to achieve this aim by ensur-
ing that corporate securities issuers provide the investing public
with all information necessary to make informed investment de-
cisions.8 4 The disclosure rules are not intended to prevent inves-
tors from making unwise investment decisions.8 5 Rather, they
attempt only to guarantee that investors have the opportunity to
review pertinent information before they purchase securities.8 6
1. Registration Requirements
The centerpiece of the Securities Act is Section 5,87 which
states that no security shall be offered or sold unless it is regis-
tered with the SEC.88 An issuer registers a primary offering of
securities by filing a registration statement with the Commis-
sion. 9 The registration statement consists of two documents:
the prospectus,9  which must be given to every purchaser of the
(2) transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.
Id. These two exemptions are termed the non-underwriter and private placement ex-
emptions. SeeJennings, supra note 1, at 322-76, 459-523 (discussing private placement
and non-underwriter exemptions).
83. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). In its report to the U.S. Senate,
the Committee on Banking and Currency stated that "[t]he basic policy of [the Securi-
ties Act] is that of... providing protection against fraud and misrepresentation." Id.
84. H.R. Doc. No. 12, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). In his address to Congress,
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt stated that "every issue of new securities to be sold
in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and information, and...
no essentially important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buy-
ing public." Id. The Securities Act takes the premise that public companies are public
bodies and its managers public functionaries. ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY
PRosEctrnoN 41 (1982). The Supreme Court has defined the Securities Act as legisla-
tion that substitutes a philosophy of full disclosure in securities issuance for the "buyer
beware" model. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
85. See Louis Loss, FuNDAMmrrAs OF SECURrrms REGULATION 25-35 (1988) (dis-
cussing history of U.S. debate over securities regulation). Congress did not take away
the investor's right to "make a fool of himself." Id. at 33. It only attempted to lessen
the likelihood that others would make fools of investors. Id.
86. See KARMEL, supra note 84, at 40-42 (discussing U.S. Congress' purpose in
adopting Securities Act); see also MESSAGE FRoM THE PansmENT OF THE UNrr STATES,
supra note 82, at 1. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated that "the Federal Gov-
ernment cannot and should not take any action which might be construed as approving
or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will
be maintained or that the properties which they represent will earn profit." Id.
87. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 7(a).
90. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(10). Section 2(10) defines prospectus as follows:
The term "prospectus" means any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement,
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securities,"' and a second part, which contains information that
need not be distributed to purchasers, but is kept in a public file
by the SEC.9" Schedule A of the Securities Act prescribes the
basic contents of the registration statement.93 Until the registra-
tion statement becomes effective,94 the issuer cannot sell its se-
curities to the public.9 The registration statement becomes ef-
fective either on a date authorized by the SEC, twenty days after
filing,96 or, if the SEC issues a stop order,9 7 once the stop order
is lifted.98 Issuers who do not comply with the registration proce-
dures prescribed by the Securities Act are subject to a variety of
civil and criminal sanctions.99
letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any
security for sale or confirms the sale of any security; except that (a) a commu-
nication sent or given after the effective date of the registration statement
(other than a prospectus permitted under subsection (b) of section 10) shall
not be deemed a prospectus if it is proved prior to or at the same time with
such communication a written prospectus meeting the requirements of sub-
section (a) of section 10 at the time of such communication was sent or given
to the person to whom the communication was made, and (b) a notice, circu-
lar, advertisement letter, or communication in respect of a security shall not
be deemed to be a prospectus if it states from whom a written prospectus
meeting the requirements of Section 10 may be obtained and, in addition,
does no more than identify the security, state the price thereof, state by whom
orders will be executed, and contain such other information as the Commis-
sion, by rules or regulations deemed necessary or appropriate in the public
interest and for the protection of investors, and subject to terms and condi-
tions as may be prescribed therein, may permit.
Id.; see id. § 10 (discussing information required in prospectus).
91. Id. § 5(b).
92. See Regulation C - Registration, 17 C.F.R. 230.400-230.495 (1994) (discussing
SEC requirements for effective registration under Securities Act).
93. Securities Act of 1933, sched. A.
94. See JENNFN;s, supra note 1, at 251. An effective registration statement is one
which has been formally approved for distribution to the public by the SEC. IM
95. See Securities Act of 1933 § 8 (discussing effectiveness of registration state-
ments and amendments thereto).
96. Id. § 8(a).
97. Id. § 8(d). The Securities Act defines a stop order as an order which, after the
filing of a registration statement, suspends the effectiveness of such registration state-
ment until such time as the contents of the registration statement have been amended
in accordance with SEC requirements. Id.
98. Id
99. See id. §§ 8A, 11, 20 (discussing sanctioning power of SEC and private remedies
available to purchasers in regard to unregistered securities).
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2. Private Remedies
Under Section 12(1) of the Securities Act, °00 purchasers of
unregistered securities may sue for return of the consideration
paid, upon return of the securities to the seller, or damages, if
the securities have already been sold.10 In order to recover, the
purchaser need only prove that the defendant sold the securities
to him and that they were not registered.10 2 A successful claim
shifts the burden to the defendant to demonstrate the availabil-
ity of an exemption from registration. 03 A purchaser, however,
can generally sue only the person from whom he bought the
securities, or a person who solicits the purchase for his own fi-
nancial purposes or those of the seller. 04 Thus an issuer who
sells unregistered securities to an underwriter for resale is not
directly liable' to the individual investor.0 5
3. The Investigatory and Sanctioning Powers of the SEC
U.S. securities laws grant the SEC authority to investigate
alleged violations of the Securities Act registration require-
ments.106 If, after investigating, the Commission determines that
100. Id. § 12. Section 12 of the Securities Act states in pertinent part as follows:
Any person who-
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 5... shall be liable to
the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration
paid thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the
tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
Id,
101. IL
102. Ralph C. Ferrara & Andrea Robinson, The Development of Express and Implied
Remedies Under 77e Secuyitier Act of 1933 and The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 7-8, in
INTRODUCTION TO LITIGATION OF DisPUrEs AmFrI'NG THE U.S. AND THE U.K. 409, 429-30
(PLI Corp. L ahd Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-6796, 1987). A seller who
violates the 1933 Act's registration requirements is strictly liable to purchasers under
Section 12(1). Id.; see Securities Act of 1933 § 12(1) (granting private remedy of rescis-
sion or damages to purchasers against for failure of an issuer to register securities).
103. Id. A seller of unregistered securities is strictly liable to his or her buyer. Id.
104. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 655 (1988).
105. See Collins v. Signetics, 605 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1979). Recently, a number of
courts have reduced the efficacy of this private remedy by holding that Section 12 ap-
plies only to initial distributions, and cannot be used to impose liability on brokers for
their recommendations. See, e.g., Ballay v. Legg Mason, 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that brokers may not be liable under § 12(2) for facilitating sales using materi-
ally false registration statements).
106. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21. Section 21(a) (1) provides as follows:
The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it deems
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a violation has occurred or is about to occur, it may take one of
three actions against the alleged violator.107 First, it may order
an administrative hearing to ascertain who is liable, and to issue
cease and desist orders.108 Second, the Commission may bring
an action in federal court to enjoin violations of the registration
requirements 09 or to seek civil penalties.1 0 Third, the SEC may
transmit evidence of willful violations of Section 5 and its subsidi-
ary rules to the U.S. Justice Department, which may decide to
undertake a criminal prosecution."' These willful violations are
necessary to determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is
about to violate any provision under this title, the rules or regulations thereun-
der.., and may require or permit any person to file with it a statement in
writing, under oath... as to all the facts and circumstances concerning the
matter to be investigated.
Id Section 20(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides as follows:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission, either upon complaint or other-
wise, that the provisions of this title, or of any rule or regulation prescribed
under authority thereof, have been or about to be violated, it may, in its discre-
tion, either require or permit such person to file with it a statement in writing,
under oath, or otherwise, as to all the facts and circumstances concerning th
subject matter which it believes to be in the public interest to investigate, and
may investigate such facts.
Securities Act of 1933 § 20.
107. See id. §§ 8A, 20(b)-(c) (discussing power of SEC to seek sanctions for failure
of issuer to register securities).
108. Id. § 8A. The Commission may issue a cease and desist order, after giving
notice and an opportunity to be heard, to any person who is violating, has violated, or is
about to violate § 5. Id
109. Id. § 20.
110. Id If the SEC uncovers an alleged violation of § 5, it may, under § 20(d),
"bring an action in a United States district court to seek. . . a civil penalty to be paid by
the person who committed such violation." Id. Innocent failures to register are punish-
able by the greater of fines of up to US$5000 for a natural person and up to US$50,000
for any other person, or the gross monetary gain to such violator as a result of the
violation. Id. § 20(d) (2) (A). Fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative failures to register
are punishable by fines that do not exceed the greater of either US$50,000 for natural
persons and US$250,000 for any other person, or the gross amount of monetary gain to
the violator as a result of the violation. I& § 20(d) (2) (B). Fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative failures to register that result in substantial losses or create a significant
risk of financial losses to other persons are punishable by fines that do not exceed the
greater of US$100,000 for natural, persons and US$500,000 for any other person, or the
gross amount of monetary gain to the violator due to the violation. Id § 20(d) (2) (C).
111. I& § 20(b). Section 20(b) states in pertinent part as follows:
The Commission may transmit such evidence as may be available concerning
such acts or practices to the Attorney General who may, in his discretion, insti-
tute the necessary criminal proceedings under this title. Any such criminal
proceeding may be brought either in the district wherein the transmittal of
the prospectus or security complained of begins, or in the district wherein
such security or prospectus is received.
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punishable by fines and imprisonment.11 2
C. SEC Regulation of Offshore Transactions Prior to Regulation S
The SEC's position concerning the applicability of the Se-
curities Act" s registration requirements to offshore transactions
has evolved with the growth of the offshore markets."1 4 During
the thirty years following the adoption of the Securities Act, the
SEC viewed the securities laws as a protective shield that applied
to U.S. citizens, residents, and corporations both within and
without the United States. 1 One result of this approach was
that U.S. investors were largely unable to participate in the off-
shore markets due to issuers' fears that the presence of a U.S.
citizen, resident, or corporation in an international offering
would force them to comply with the Securities Act registration
requirements." 6 In 1963, the U.S. government, facing a balance
of payments deficit, recognized the need for the SEC to make it
easier for U.S. corporations to raise capital overseas."" Re-
sponding to the recommendations of the Presidential Task
Force on Promoting Increased Foreign Investment in United
States Corporate Securities and Increased Foreign Financing for
U.S. Corporations Operating Abroad,"18 the SEC promulgated
Securities Release 4708 ("Release 4708")." °
I&
112. Id. § 24. Section 24 states in pertinent part as follows: "Any person who will-
fully violates any of the provisions of this title, or the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Commission under the authority thereof,... shall upon conviction be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." I&
113. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
114. SeeJoseph A. Grundfest, Zen and the Art of Securities Regulation, in MODERNIZING
U.S. SEcua'rms REoULArION: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL P.RSPEaCrrEs 3, 10 (Kenneth Lehn
& Robert W. KamphuisJr. eds., 1992) (discussing changes in SEC approach as result of
internationalization of securities markets).
115. Kellye Y. Testy, Comity and Cooperation: Secutities Regulation in a Global Market-
plac,45 AL& L REv. 927, 940 (1994); seeJoHNsoN, supra note 1, at 469 (discussing SEC
prohibiton of any non.exempt sales of unregistered securities to U.S. citizens and resi-
dents prior to Regulation S).
116. Testy, supra note 115, at 941 (discussing restraints on U.S. investor participa-
tion in offshore markets prior to adoption of Regulation S).
117. Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers; Registration of Under-
writers of Foreign Offerings as Broker-Dealers, Securities Act Release No. 4708 [1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1 1361, 1964 WL 3661 (SEC), at 1 (July 9,
1964) [hereinafter Release 4708].
118. Id.
119. Id. Section 19(a) of the Securities Act grants the SEC the power to issue,
amend and repeal rules and regulations relating thereto. Securities Act of 1933 § 19,
1995]
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Release 4708 officially reiterated the SEC's previous posi-
tion that the Securities Act registration requirements were pri-
marily intended to protect U.S. investors.120  Having analyzed
various statutory exemptions contained in the Securities Act,121
the SEC, in Release 4708, stated that the Securities Act registra-
tion requirements would not apply to offshore offerings, even if
the means of U.S. interstate commerce were used, 22 as long as
the offering was made outside the United States to non-U.S. per-
sons123 in a manner that would ensure that the securities would
come to rest abroad.124 The purpose of the coming to rest
15 U.S.C. § 77s (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 19 states as follows: "(a) The Commis-
sion shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title .... The rules
and regulations shall be effective upon publication in the manner which the Commis-
sion shall prescribe." I&
120. Id.
121. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing and defining statutory
exemptions from Securities Act registration requirements).
122. Release 4708, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 1361, at 1362. Section 5 of the
Securities Act of 1933 makes it illegal to use the means of interstate commerce to sell
unregistered securities. Securities Act of 1933 § 5. Because interstate commerce was
defined broadly under Release 4708, the registration requirements could have been
held to apply to deals having a minimal nexus to the United states, such as a telephone
call. Testy, supra note 115, at 939.
123. Proposed Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,661, 22,663 (June 17, 1988). Under Release
4708, the SEC staff defined the term "U.S. person" in much broader fashion than it is
defined in Regulation S. Id It included all U.S. residents and citizens, whether at
home or abroad, and organizations formed under the laws of the United States or any
of its political subdivisions. See, eg., Goldman Sachs & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2578 (Oct. 3, 1985) (discussing definition of U.S. person under
Release 4708). Under Regulation S, a U.S. person includes natural persons resident in
the U.S., U.S. partnerships or corporations, U.S. estates, U.S. trusts, agencies and
branches of foreign entities located in the U.S., and U.S.-based securities accounts.
Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(o) (1994).
124. See Release 4708, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 1361, at 1363. The requirement
that securities come to rest abroad was not defined in Release 4708. Testy, supra note
115, at 940. Instead, over a period of years, the SEC developed a set of procedures
through no-action letters to determine when the securities would be deemed to have
come to rest abroad. Proposed Rules: Offshore Offers and Sales, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,661,
22,662-63 (1988). Restrictions on the resale of debt securities included a 90 day period
following completion of the distribution during which no sales could be made in the
United States or to U.S. persons. Proctor & Gamble Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1870 (Feb.21, 1985). Restrictions on equity securities were substan-
tially more stringent. Proposed Rules: Offshore Offers and Sales, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,661,
22,662 (1988). The InfraRed Associates no-action letter provided a restricted period of
twelve months, as well as a number of other procedures that came to form the basis of
Regulation S. InfraRed Associates, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 2617 (Oct. 14, 1985).
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abroad doctrine was to limit flowback 12- of unregistered securi-
ties into the United States. 126
Although Release 4708 specified two types of offshore secur-
ities transactions that would continue to require registration
under the Securities Act,127 it did not enumerate clear guidelines
that U.S. companies could follow to ensure that their securities
would come to rest abroad.128 Due to this lack of clarity, over
the twenty-five years following the promulgation of Release 4708,
the SEC received a flood of requests for no-action letters 29 from
U.S. issuers who wished to offer and sell their securities
abroad.130 The no-action letters allowed individual issuers to de-
termine whether the steps that they planned to take to ensure
that their unregistered securities would come to rest abroad 31
would satisfy SEC requirements.3 2 During this period, the body
of -no-action letters that were issued detailed a variety of proce-
dures that could be adopted by U.S. issuers to ensure compli-
ance with the Release.1 3 3
Despite the availability of more than twenty years of no-ac-
tion letters, in the late-1980's many U.S. companies continued to
125. Testy, supra note 115, at 940.
126. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,308 (May 2, 1990) (discussing
SEC approach to offshore application of Securities Act registration requirements under
Release 4708). Under Release 4708, the SEC staff refused to state what conditions
would allow securities issued pursuant to Release 4708 to be resold in the United States
or to U.S. persons. Id. Instead, the staff continually stated that resales could only be
made if the securities were registered or qualified for an exemption from registration.
Id.
127. See Release 4708, supra note 117, at 2. Release 4708 stated that distributions
of U.S. corporate securities through the facilities of Canadian stock exchanges and pub-
lic offerings specifically directed towards U.S. nationals abroad would always be subject
to registration. Id.
128. See Testy, supra note 115, at 939 (discussing lack of clarity of Release 4708).
129. SeeJENNmNas, supra note 1, at 101-02 (discussing SEC administrative proce-
dures). A no-action letter is a letter, written by the staff of the SEC, in response to a
request from the attorney of an issuer or investor. Id. at 101. If the staff of the SEC
agrees with the attorney's interpretation, the no-action letter will state that the staff will
not recommend any enforcement action if the attorney's client adheres to the proce-
dures and facts discussed in the attorney's letter. Id. No-action letters are available to
the public. Id. They do not, however, bind the Commission, which has overruled no-
action letters in the past. I&
130. Berger, supra note 4, at 580-81.
131. See supra note 124 (discussing concept of securities coming to rest abroad).
132. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,308 (May 2, 1990).
133. See supra note 124-26 and accompanying text (discussing procedures adopted
through no-action process to ensure that offshore distributions would come to rest
abroad).
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find it necessary to protect themselves from sanctions by request-
ing their own determinations from the SEC.1 - 4 The costs and
length of time necessary to resolve these uncertainties continued
to limit the ability of U.S. corporations to raise capital over-
seas.8 5 The SEC, therefore, found its human resources over-
taxed by the growth and internationalization of the securities
markets."8 6 In recognition of the increasing involvement of U.S.
issuers and investors in the international markets,'8 7 the Com-
mission, as part of an overall re-evaluation of its regulatory struc-
ture,""8 decided to standardize the procedures that corporations
could follow to legally issue unregistered, non-exempt securities
outside of the United States.'8 9
134. See, eg., Proctor & Gamble Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 53956 (Feb.
21, 1985); see also Pan American World Airways, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL
11264 (May 28, 1975).
135. Wolff, supra note 1, at 112-13. A number of commentators claimed that Re-
lease 4708 increased the cost of capital for U.S. issuers who chose to access the offshore
markets. See, eg., SEC Releases Proposals on International Transactions, 20 Sec.Reg. &
L.Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 912 (June 17, 1988) (discussing increased cost of capital for
U.S. issuers under Release 4708).
136. See Grundfest, supra note 114, at 3 (discussing future of U.S. securities regula-
tion). The increasing ability of issuers and investors to find substitutes for the U.S.
markets meant that new SEC rules would have to be more sensitive to changes in the
markets than they were in the past. Id. at 4.
137. Andreas J. Roquette, New Developments Relating to the Internationalization of the
Capital Markets: A Comparison of Legislative Reforms in the United States, the European Com-
munity, and Germany, 14 U. PA.J. INT'L Bus. L. 565 (1994). Recently, there has been a
significant increase in the number of U.S. investors trading in non-U.S. securities and
the number of U.S. companies issuing securities overseas. Id.
138. See Grundfest, supra note 114, at 9-10 (discussing value of regulatory diver-
sity). This re-evaluation began with the 1982 adoption of Regulation D, which restruc-
tured the private placement rules. Regulation D - Rules Governing the Limited Offer
and Sales of Securities Without Registration Under the Securities Act, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.501-230.508 (1994); seeJoHNsoN, supra note 1, at 336-48 (discussing procedures
of Regulation D). Another early example of this restructuring was the adoption of Rule
415, which eased restrictions on shelf registration of new issues by reporting companies.
Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale of Securities, 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1994); see
JoHNsoN, supra note 1, at 377-415 (discussing shelf-registration procedures). Addition-
ally, at the same time as Regulation S was adopted, the SEC adopted Rule 144A, which
provided an exemption from registration for securities sold to sophisticated institu-
tional investors. Private Resales of Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A
(1994) [hereinafter Rule 144A]; seeJoINsoN, supra note 1, at 353-57 (discussing proce-
dures of Rule 144A).
139. Bevis Longstreth et al., Regulation S and Rule 144A: Has the SEC Got It Right?,
INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1989, at 30. Regulation S is designed to provide guidance and
certainty for offshore issuers. Id. Although Regulation S has codified guidelines for the
offshore exemption, some commentators have argued that it is not as clear as the SEC
originally intended. Kelley & Bannister, supra note 11, at 166.
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D. The Regulation S Approach
On April 23, 1990, after three years of research, analysis,
and discussion by and between the Commission, major invest-
ment banks, law firms, and corporate financial executives,140 the
SEC replaced Release 4708 with Regulation S.14 1 The adoption
of Regulation S represented a revolutionary change in the SEC's
approach to the extraterritorial application of the Securities
Act.1 42 Unlike Release 4708, which severely restricted sales to
U.S. persons, Regulation S takes a geographic approach to the
application of the Securities Act registration requirements.143
Consequently, the availability of Regulation S is not predicated
on whether the securities are offered and sold to a U.S. person,
but on whether the offer and sale is made outside of the United
States or its territories.'"
1. The Structure of Regulation S
Regulation S went into effect on May 2, 1990.145 It consists
of four rules, introduced by seven preliminary notes that limit
the scope of the regulation. 46 Rule 901 contains a general state-
140. See Proposed Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,661 (June 17, 1988) (discussing initial
proposal for Regulation S); Proposed Rules, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,063 (July 18, 1989) (dis-
cussing second proposal for Regulation S); Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306 (May
2. 1990) (discussing Regulation S as adopted).
141. Regulation S-Rules Governing Offers and Sales Made Outside of the United
States Without Registration Under the Securities Act of, 1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-
230.904 (1994).
142. Edward F. Greene, Reproposed SEC Rue 144A, in 21sr ANNUAL INsrrrurE ON
SEcuRrrms REGULATION, at 43 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
662, 1990). At the symposium, Greene, an SEC Commissioner, stated that he believed
that both Regulation S and Rule 144A represented a revolution in the SEC's approach
to the Securities Act of 1933. Id. Whereas prior to the adoption of Regulation S the
SEC prohibited the offer and sale of unregistered securities to U.S. citizens, residents,
or corporations by any corporation, Regulation S has, in many instances, made it legal
for U.S. persons to purchase securities in offshore primary and secondary markets.
Wolff, supra note 4, at 105.
143. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,308. The regulation takes a territo-
rial, rather than citizenship, approach to § 5 of the Securities Act. Id. Unlike Release
4708, which sought to protect U.S. purchasers worldwide, Regulation S seeks only to
protect U.S. capital markets and those purchasing on them. Id. Therefore, as long as
the offers and sales take place outside of the United States, they are exempt from Sec-
tion 5 even if the securities are sold to U.S. citizens. Berger, supra note 4, at 581.
144. Berger, supra note 4, at 581.
145. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,306.
146. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-230.904, prelim. notes (discussing applicability of
Regulation S).
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ment of applicability. 147 Rule 902 provides definitions for many
of the terms used in Regulation S.148 Rules 903149 and 904150
provide safe harbor guidelines. 151
2. The General Statement of Regulation S
Under Release 4708,1-2 the SEC took the position that issu-
ers could not sell unregistered securities to U.S. persons regard-
less of where in the world they resided.'53 In contrast, the gen-
eral policy of Regulation S, contained in Rule 901, specifies that
the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 are
not applicable to any offshore securities transactions.15 4 Conse-
quently, the regulation lays out extensive parameters for ascer-
taining whether a distribution takes place outside of the United
States.155
3. The Safe Harbor Concept
Rules 903 and 904 provide safe harbors, adherence to which
by offshore issuers and sellers of unregistered securities ensures
that registration under the Securities Act is not required. 156 The
147. 17 C.F.R. § 230.901. Rule 901 states that the registration requirements shall
not be applicable to any securities transaction that takes place outside of the United
States. Id.
148. 17 C.F.R. § 230.902. Rule 902 provides definitions for most of the important
terms used in Regulation S, including Designated Offshore Securities Market, Directed
Selling Efforts, Distributor, Domestic Issuer, Foreign Government, Offering Restric-
tions, Offshore Transaction, Overseas Directed Offering, Reporting Issuer, Restricted
Period, and U.S. Person. Id.
149. 17 C.F.R. § 230.903.
150. 17 C.F.R. § 230.904.
151. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,315-20 (May 2, 1990) (discuss-
ing the procedures of issuer and resale safe harbors). A safe harbor is defined as a set
of guidelines in the federal securities regulations that, if followed, give issuers and their
agents protection from sanctions. SeeJennings, supra note 1, at 1595 (discussing Regu-
lation S safe harbors).
152. Release 4708, supra note 117, at 1.
153. See Wolff, supra note 4, at 105.
154. 17 C.F.R. § 230.901. Rule 901 states as follows:
For the purposes only of Section 5 of the Act [15 U.S.C. § 77e], the terms
"offer," "offer to sell," "sell," "sale," and "offer to buy" shall be deemed to in-
clude offers and sales that occur within the United States and shall be deemed
not to include offers and sales that occur outside the United States.
Id.
155. Berger, supra note 4, at 581. Rule 902(p) defines "United States" as the
United States of America, its territories and possessions, any State and the District of
Columbia. 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(p).
156. See BuREAu OF NATIONAL AFMARs, CORORATE PRACncE SEmas LEAFLE No.
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SEC adopted a territorial approach1 57 to these safe harbors for
three reasons.1 58  First, the Commission, having accepted the
principle of international comity, determined that offshore dis-
tributions of securities that are regulated under the securities
laws of another nation need not be governed by the Securities
Act. 15 9 Second, the SEC discovered that the use of territorially-
based safe harbors would best enable the Commission to stand-
ardize the procedures necessary to limit the possibility of
flowback of Regulation S securities into the United States.1 60
Third, the Commission concluded that because U.S. investors
have significant access to information concerning reporting issu-
ers,16 1 some flowback of reporting issuers' securities would not
harm U.S. investors.162 The ability of offshore investors to easily
resell securities outside of the United States without registration
under the Securities Act is essential to the SEC's goal of improv-
ing U.S. corporate access to international capital.1 63 By adopting
a geographic approach to the safe harbors, Regulation S allows
routine trading of unregistered U.S. corporate securities on the
offshore secondary marketsIM once the issuers' international
58, REGULA'rroN S: THE SAFE HARBOR FOR OFFSHORE SEcuRmTES TRANSACTIONS (1991)
[hereinafter CoRrorATE PRAcric LEALEr]. Although these safe harbors apply to both
U.S. and non-U.S. issuers, this Note does not examine the provisions relating to distri-
butions by non-U.S. issuers.
157. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text (discussing SEC adoption of
territorial approach).
158. See Proposed Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,661, 22,665 (June 17, 1988) (discussing
three propositions underlying creation of Regulation S safe harbors).
159. Id. The principle of comity is defined as the willingness of one sovereign to
recognize the laws of another either within its borders or as regards its citizens, not as a
matter of right, but out of deference and good will. BLACK's LAw DicrovA 267 (6th
ed. 1990). The SEC has stated that principles of comity and the reasonable expecta-
tions of offshore market participants justify the position implicit in Regulation S that
the laws of the countries in which the transactions take place, rather than U.S. laws,
should apply to those transactions. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18306, 18308 (May
2, 1990). An investor who chooses to participate in markets outside of the United
States chooses the law of those markets. Id.
160. See Proposed Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,661, 22,665 (discussing SEC duty to pro-
tect U.S. investors against flowback).
161. Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(1) (1994). A reporting issuer is one, other
than an investment company regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940, that is
already subject to the disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange Act at the
time it undertakes a Regulation S offering. Id
162. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,315 (discussing SEC acceptance
of limited amount of flowback of Category Two securities).
163. See Wolff, supra note 4, at 112-17 (discussing history of Regulation S).
164. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (defining secondary markets).
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marketing efforts and distribution have terminated. 16
a. General Conditions
Regulation S mandates that all offers and sales of unregis-
tered securities by U.S. companies comply with two general re-
strictions. 166 First, the offer and sale must be made in an off-
shore transaction. 167  Rule 902(i) defines the term offshore
transaction in a manner that places the focus of the requirement
on the location of the buyer. 168 Second, no directed selling ef-
forts maybe made in the United States. 169 Rule 902(b) defines
165. See Proposed Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,661, 22,665 n.63 (discussing lessening of
differences between sales on offshore primary and secondary markets).
166. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903(a), 230.904(a).
167. IM
168. 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(i). Rule 902(i) defines "offshore transaction" as follows:
(1) An offer or sale of securities is made in an "offshore transaction" if:
(i) The offer is not made to a person in the United States; and
(ii) Either:
(A) At the time the buy order is originated, the buyer is outside the
United States, or the seller and any person acting on its behalf rea-
sonably believe that the buyer is outside the United States; or
(B) For the purposes of:
(1) Section 230.903, the transaction is executed in, on or
through a physical trading floor of an established foreign securi-
ties exchange that is located outside of the United States; or
(2) Section 230.904, the transaction is executed in, on or
through the facilities of a designated offshore securities market
described in paragraph (a) of this section, and neither the seller
nor any person acting on its behalf knows that the transaction
has been pre-arranged with a buyer in the United States.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (i) (1) of this section, offers and sales of secur-
ities specifically targeted at identifiable groups of U.S. citizens abroad, such as
members of the U.S. armed forces serving overseas, shall not be deemed to be
made in "offshore transactions."
(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (i) (1) of this section, offers and sales of secur-
ities to persons excluded from the definition of "U.S. person" pursuant to par-
agraph (o) (7) of this section or persons holding accounts excluded from the
definition of "U.S. person" pursuant to paragraph (o) (2) of this section, solely
in their capacities as holders of such accounts, shall be deemed to be made in
"offshore transactions."
Id.
169. 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b). For the purposes of the issuer safe harbor,"[n]o di-
rected selling efforts shall be made in the United States by the issuer, a distributor, any
of their respective affiliates, or any person acting on behalf of the foregoing." Id. For
the purposes of the resale safe harbor, "[n]o directed selling efforts shall be made in
the United States by the seller, an affiliate, or any person acting on their behalf." 17
C.F.R. § 230.904(b).
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the term directed selling efforts.170 Publication of information
in the United States concerning a reporting issuer17 1 that is not
specifically related to the offshore distribution will not be
deemed to be a directed selling effort.'7 2 The SEC has inter-
preted directed selling efforts in this manner in order to ensure
that reporting Regulation S issuers do not lose their safe harbor
protection due to incidental distribution of information within
the United States, or by complying with U.S. or non-U.S. disclo-
sure laws.'73 If a transaction meets the conditions, it can qualify
for the following specific safe harbors. 7 4
170. 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(b) (1). Rule 902(b) (1) defines "directed selling efforts"
as
any activity undertaken for the purpose of, or that could reasonably be ex-
,pected to have the effect of, conditioning the market in the United States for
any of the securities being offered in reliance on this Regulation S. Such activ-
ity includes placement of an advertisement in a publication with a general
circulation in the United States that refers to the offering of securities being
made in reliance upon this Regulation S.
Id. Distribution of information about, opinions on, or recommendations of the securi-
ties in the United States may constitute directed selling efforts depending on the facts.
CORPORATE PRAcCE LpAzrr, supra note 156, at A-6.
171. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing Regulation S definition
of reporting issuer).
172. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,312 (May 2, 1990). Generally, the
dissemination of routine information by reporting issuers that is not related to the se-
curities selling effort, such* as advertising and corporate communication, will not be
deemed a "directed selling effort" under Regulation S. Id. Because publication of in-
formation by non-reporting issuers can have a substantial effect on the demand for its
securities, distributors of securities of non-reporting issuer securities and their affiliates
must exercise extreme caution when disseminating information in order to avoid fall-
ing afoul of the prohibition against "directed selling efforts." Id at 18,311. Further-
more, legitimate selling activities carried out in the United States in connection with a
registered offering made in conjunction with the Regulation S offering or an exempt
unregistered offering, will not cause the issuer to violate the restriction against "di-
rected selling efforts." Id. at 18,312. The SEC believes that this interpretation isjustifed
because dissemination of information about reporting issuers has less effect on the mar-
ket than dissemination of information about non-reporting issuers. See Testy, supra
note 115, at 945-47 (discussing SEC definition of "directed selling efforts").
173. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,310-312 (discussing SEC inter-
pretation of "directed selling efforts"). For example, an advertisement placed in a U.S.
publication will not be deemed a "directed selling effort" if it is mandated by U.S. law,
as long as the advertisement includes a statement that the securities offered for sale are
unregistered. I& The SEC has long maintained the position that prohibitions on "di-
rected selling efforts" are not meant to prohibit normal communications between issu-
ers and their shareholders. Securities Act Release No. 5009, 34 Fed. Reg. 16,870 (Oct.
7, 1969).
174. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,314 (discussing reliance on Cat-
egory One safe harbor based solely on compliance with general conditions); id at
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b. Specific Safe Harbors
i. Issuer Safe Harbor Procedures
In order to regulate offshore primary offerings,17 Rule 903
divides the issuer safe harbor into three categories.1 76 Category
One applies only to non-U.S. issuers. 177 Category Two applies to
reporting issuers, 178 and certain securities issued by non-report-
ing, non-U.S. issuers.1 79 Category Three covers the securities of
all other issuers.18
The SEC has taken this categorization approach in recogni-
tion of two facts. First, the likelihood of misuse of the offshore
exemption and flowback of securities distributed thereunder var-
ies depending on the type of issuer and security.18 1 Second, in-
vestors in unregistered securities issued by reporting issuers18 2
retain the protection of the Exchange Act periodic reporting re-
quirements.183 As a result, Regulation S prescribes fewer restric-
18,315 (discussing applicability of general conditions to Category Two safe harbor); id
at 18,318 (discussing applicability of general conditions to Category Three safe harbor).
175. See MASHALL & ELus, supra note 5, at 60. There are two types of primary
offerings: the Initial Public Offering ("IPO"), which is an offering of securities to the
public for the first time, and the Public Offering, which is a flotation of new securities
by an issuer with existing publicly traded securities. Id.
176. Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903(c) (1)-230.903(c) (3) (1994).
177. Id. § 230.903(c)(1). Because this Note deals exclusively with problems re-
lated to securities sold by U.S. issuers, Category One will not be discussed.
178. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing definition of"reporting
issuer").
179. 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c) (2).
180. Id. § 230.903(c) (3).
181. Berger, supra note 4, at 585. Use of the safe harbor as part of a scheme to
evade the Securities Act registration requirements constitutes misuse. 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.901-230.904 prelim. n.2. The provisions of the various safe harbors reflect the
likelihood of flowback into the United States, and the amount of information available
to the U.S. markets regarding the issuer. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,313
(May 2, 1990). Investors in corporate debt, unlike purchasers of stock, are protected
not only by U.S. securities laws, but also by the negotiated indenture, or debt agree-
ment. See LEws D. SOLOMON ar AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AN Poucv 227 (1994) (dis-
cussing contents of debt indentures).
182. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (defining reporting issuer).
183. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,316. If flowback does occur, the
information relating to the reporting issuers securities that is publicly available under
the Exchange Act will ensure investor protection. Id. The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 requires reporting companies to file quarterly and annual financial and informa-
tional reports, called 10-Qs and 10-Ks, on the financial status of the company. See Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also ROBERT
E. SHIEws & ROBERT H. STROUSE, SECURITIES PRAcrCE HANDBOOK 310-19 (5th ed.
1987) (discussing reporting requirements of Exchange Act).
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tions for securities offered by reporting issuers than for non-re-
porting issuers, and, in Category Three, for debt rather than eq-
uity securities.18 4
The SEC's primary concern in Category Two is the preven-
tion of distributions of unregistered securities by reporting issu-
ers' within the United States after U.S. investors have been
primed for acceptance.' 8 Securities in Category Two must com-
ply with two offering restrictions 8 7 and two transactional restric-
tions.18 8  The offering restrictions are shielding measures
designed to ensure compliance with Regulation S.' 9 The first
offering restriction requires each distributor to agree in writing
that all offers and sales made prior to the expiration of the forty-
day period shall be made in compliance with all applicable provi-
184. See Proposed Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,661, 22,672 (June 17, 1988) (discussing
procedures of issuer safe harbors). Few transactional restrictions are imposed on secur-
ities offered by reporting issuers. Id Significant transactional restrictions are imposed,
however, on non-reporting issuers. Id Furthermore, the risk of flowback into the
United States of various categories of securities determines the amount of restrictions
imposed on the offering. M. Therefore, having recognized that the market for debt
consists primarily of institutional investors and that the likelihood of flowback is lim-
ited, the SEC has imposed more restrictive procedures on category three equity than
debt. Id.
185. See supm note 161 and accompanying text (defining reporting issuer).
186. CoaoRATE Pa.AcncE LEALzr, supra note 156, at A-8.
187. Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(h) (1994). Rule 902(h) defines "offering
restrictions" in pertinent part as follows:
(1) Each distributor [must agree] in writing that all offers and sales of
the securities prior to the expiration of the restricted period specified in sec-
tion 230.903(c)(2) or (3), as applicable, shall be made only. in accordance
with the provisions of section 230.903 or section 230.904; pursuant to registra-
tion of the securities under the Act; or pursuant to an available exemption
from the registration requirements of the [Securities] Act; and
(2) All offering materials and documents (other than press releases)
used in connection with offers and sales of the securities prior to the expira-
tion of the restricted period specified in section 230.903(c) (2) or (3), as appli-
cable, shall include statements to the effect that the securities have not been
registered under the Act and may not be offered or sold in the United States
or to U.S. persons (other than distributors) unless the securities are registered
under the [Securities] Act, or an exemption from the registration require-
ments of the Act is available ....
IM
188. See Wolff, supra note 4, at 135-39 (discussing transactional restrictions of Reg-
ulation S safe harbors). Transactional restriction is a term that is peculiar to the adopt-
ing release. I4 at 136. It includes procedures that are specific to the individual safe
harbor categories, such as restricted periods, during which no sales may be made to
U.S. persons, and identifying legends that must placed on the securities. IM
189. Wolff, supra note 4, at 136.
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sions of Regulation S.190 The second offering restriction re-
quires that advertisements, tombstones,1 91 prospectues, 192 and
all other materials, except press releases, used to facilitate the
initial sale of Category Two securities state that the securities are
unregistered and cannot be offered or sold in the United States
absent registration or a valid exemption. 193 Furthermore, the
marketing materials must also specify that the securities cannot
be offered or sold to U.S. persons, except distributors, during
the applicable restricted period unless they are registered or
qualify for an exemption from the registration requirements.'"
The Category Two safe harbor transactional restrictions are as
follows. "95 First, during a forty-day restricted period, the offer or
sale may not be made to, or for the account or benefit of, a U.S.
person other than a distributor.1 96  Second, any distributor,
dealer, or person receiving a selling commission for Category
Two securities sold during the forty-day restricted period must
send a confirmation or notice to the purchaser informing them
that they are subject to the same restrictions that apply to the
190. 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(h) (1); see supra note 187 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing offering restrictions on Regulation S distributions).
191. See MARSHrAL & ELUs, supra note 5, at 70. A "tombstone" is an advertisement,
usually in major financial newspapers or periodicals, that a public offering of securities
is being made. Id. It does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to
buy securities, and must state so clearly. Id.
192. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(10). The Securities Act defines prospectus as "any
prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by ra-
dio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security."
Id. The Securities Act mandates that corporations making public stock offerings'file a
prospectus with the SEC as part of the registration statement. Id. § 6. The issuer must
follow the format for its prospectus prescribed in Schedule A of the Securities Act. Id.
§ 7.
193. 17 C.F.R. § 290.902(h) (2); see supra note 187 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing offering restrictions imposed on Regulation S distributions).
194. Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(h) (2) (1994).
195. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,316 (May 2, 1990) (discussing
contents of transactional restrictions).
196. 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c) (2) (iii). Rule 902(m) defines "restricted period" as the
"period that commences on the later of the date upon which the securities were first
offered to persons other than distributors in reliance upon this Regulation S or the date
of closing of the offering, and expires" on a date specified in Rule 903(c) (2) or (3). 17
C.F.R. § 230.902(m) (1990). Regardless of the number of days specified in the specific
safe harbor, sales made by distributors from an allotment are considered to be made
during the restricted period. CoRPoRATE PRAcnnc L 1T, supra note 156, at A-8 n.30.
Rule 902(c) defines distributor as "any underwriter, dealer, or other person who partici-
pates, pursuant to h contractual arrangement, in the distribution of the securities of-
fered or sold in reliance on this Regulation S." 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(c).
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distributor. 97
Unlike the SEC's approach in Category Two, which presup-
poses that significant issuer information is available to market
participants, 198 the SEC developed Category Three with the as-
sumption that little, if any, information is available to the market
concerning the issuer and its securities.'99 As a result, Regula-
tion S places the strongest restrictions of all on sales of Category
Three securities. 00 Under Category Three, securities are subject
not only to the general conditions20 ' and offering conditions, 202
but issuers must also meet a set of increased transactional restric-
tions. 203 These transactional restrictions are similar to proce-
dures adopted under Release 4708.204 During a forty-day re-
stricted period,: debt securities must be represented by a non-
transferable temporary global security and may not be ex-
changed for a :permanent bond until the restricted period has
expired and the purchaser has certified that he is either a non-
U.S. person or a U.S. person who purchased the debt in an ex-
empted transaction.20 5 All Category Three equity securities sold
under Regulation S, other than non-convertible, non-participat-
ing preferred stock,20 and asset-backed securities,20 7 are subject
197. 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c) (2) (iv).
198. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18306, 18,316. (discussing SEC concerns
about flowback of Regulation S securities). The SEC has stated that in the event of
flowback of Category Two securities, the information available due to the Exchange Act
reporting requirements should ensure investor protection. Id.
199. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,318 (May 2, 1990).
200. Id.
201. 17 C.F.R. § 230.901; see supra notes 166-74 and accompanying text (discussing
the general restrictions on issuance and resales under Regulation S).
202. 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(h); see supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing
offering restrictions imposed on securities issued pursuant to Regulation S).
203. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,318 (discussing increased trans-
actional restriction for Category Three securities).
204. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,318.
205. 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c) (3) (ii) (B). Once the 40-day restricted period ends, but
prior to exchanging the Temporary Global Security for a definitive security, the Tempo-
rary Global Security bolder must certify beneficial ownership by a non-U.S. person or a
U.S. person who bought the securities in an exempt transaction. Adopting Release, 55
Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,319.
206. 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c) (4) (i). Regulation S defines non-participating pre-
ferred stock as "[n]on-convertible capital stock, the holders of which are entitled to a
preference in payment of dividends and in distribution of assets on liquidation, dissolu-
tion, or winding up of the issuer, but are not entitled to participate in residual earnings
or assets of the issuer." Id.
207. Id § 230.903(c) (4) (ii). Regulation S defines asset backed securities as fol-
lows:
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to a one-year, rather than forty-day, restricted period." 8 During
this one-year period, the equity securities of all U.S. issuers must
be stamped with a legend mandating that all transfers be made
according to the requirements of Regulation S.2" 9 Furthermore,
the issuer must place a provision in its charter or by-laws, or
agree by contract, that it may not register any transfer of securi-
ties made in contravention of Regulation S.21' Additionally, all
non-distributor purchasers of Category Three equity securities
must certify in writing that they are not U.S. persons and are not
purchasing the securities for a U.S. person unless the transaction
is exempted from registration under other SEC rules.211 Lastly,
the buyer must agree to abide by the resale provisions2 12 of Reg-
ulation S unless the securities are registered by the issuer or an-
other exemption is available.218
ii. Resale Safe Harbor
Because Section 5 of the Securities Act requires registration
of all securities sold,214 all sales of unregistered securities require
an exemption from registration, regardless of whether the sale is
(ii) Securities of a type that either.
(A) Represents an ownership interest in a pool of discrete assets, or cer-
tificates of interest or participation in such assets (including any rights
designed to assure servicing, or the receipt or timeliness of receipt by holders
of such assets, or certificates of interest or participation in such assets, of
amounts payable thereunder), provided that the assets are not generated or
originated between the issuer of the security and its affiliates; or
(B) Is secured by one or more assets or certificates of interest or partici-
pation in such assets, and the securities, by their terms, provide for payments
of principal and interest (if any) in relation to payments or resonable projec-
tions of payments on assets meeting the requirements of paragraph
(c) (4) (ii) (A) of this section, or certificates of interest or participations in as-
sets meeting such requirements.
Id For the purposes of the preceeding section, Regulation S defines assets as "securi-
ties, installment sales, accounts receiveable, notes, leases or other contracts, or other
assets that by their terms convert into cash over a finite period of time." Id.
208. Id. § 230.903(c) (3) (iii) (A). Non-covertible, non-participating preferred stock
and asset backed securities are included in the Category Two safe harbor. I
§ 230.903(c) (2).
209. Id. § 230.903(c) (3) (iii) (B) (3).
210. 1& § 230.903(c) (3) (iii) (B) (4).
211. Id. § 230.903(c) (3) (iii) (B) (1).
212. See id. § 230.904 (discussing provisions of resale safe harbor).
213. Id. § 230.903(c) (3) (iii) (B) (2).
214. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see supra
note 81 (describing contents of Section 5 of Securities Act).
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made by the issuer or a subsequent purchaser.2 15 In the absence
of such an exemption, the reseller is subject to sanctions and
may also place the issuer's exemption at risk.216 Section 4(2) of
the Securities Act provides such an exemption for private offers
and sales of securities by issuers.21 Regulation D prescribes non-
exclusive rules that issuers may follow to qualify for this private
placement exemption. 211 Section 4(1)219 of the Securities Act
grants an exemption for sales of securities by anyone who is not
an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.220 Although this exemption
appears to be expansive, it has been construed narrowly by both
the SEC and the federal courts.221  For example, SEC Rule
215. Securities Act of 1933 § 5.
216. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text (discussing SEC sanctions and
private remedies available for violation of Securities Act registration requirements).
217. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2). The registration requirements of the Securities
Act do not apply to "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering." Id.
This is the "private placement exemption." JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 315. Private
placements are used for transactions ranging from the issuance of stock in a new,
closely held corporation to placements of large amounts of securities with institutional
investors by Fortune 500 companies. Id.
218. Regulation D - Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities
without Registration under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506
(1994).
219. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1). The registration requirements of the Securities
Act do not apply to "transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter or
dealer." Id.
220. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(11). The Securities Act defines "underwriter" as
follows:
The term "underwriter" means any person who has purchased from an issuer
with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribu-
tion of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in
any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or
indirect underwriting of any such undertaking; but such term shall not in-
clude a person whose interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter
or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary distributors' or sellers' com-
mission.
Id.
221. See Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chinese Consolidated Benevolent
Assoc., 120 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1941) (holding that benevolent committee set up to sell
Chinese government bonds to provide relief for nationalist government fighting Japa-
nese occupation was an underwriter within the meaning of the Securities Act); see also
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960)
(holding that sale of unregistered securities held as collateral by bank violated Section 5
of Securities Act). The underwriter defined in section 2(11) has been termed the "stat-
utory underwriter." SeeJENNrNGs, supra note 1, at 459-60 (discussing concept of statu-
tory underwriter). The SEC has also developed an unofficial "presumptive under-
writer" doctrine. I. This doctrine has been defined in the following terms:
A person may be deemed to be an underwriter, within the meaning of§ 2(11)
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144,222 which provides a non-exclusive safe-harbor under the
Section 4(1) exemption, stringently restricts resales of unregis-
tered U.S. corporate securities boughttin private placements.225
Rule 904, thei resale safe harbor of Regulation S, however, loos-
ens the restrictions.224 It provides broad, non-exclusive protec-
tion from sanctions for all offshore resales of unregistered secur-
ities made by persons who are not members or affiliates of the
issuing group, 225 as long as they meet the same general restric-
tions prescribed for issuers.226 For the purposes of the resale
safe harbor, sales may be made on any "designated offshore se-
curities market."221
of the Securities Act, if such person purchases or acquires a significant per-
centage of the securities offered pursuant to a registered distribution, except
that such person is not deemed to be an underwriter if he resells such securi-
ties in limited quantities.
RobertJ. Ahrenholz & William E. Van Valkenberg, The Presumptive UndeuniterDoctnine:
Statutoy Underriter Stat us for Investors Puchasing a Specified Portion of a Registered Offering,
1973 UTAH L. REv. 773, 775-76 (1973). The SEC establishes quantity limitations on
resales of privately placed securities in Securities Act Rule 144. See Rule 144 - Persons
Deemed Not to Be Engaged in a Distribution and Therefore Not Underwriters, 17
C.F.R. § 230.144(e).
222. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144.
223. Id. Rule 144 is designed to promote "full and fair" disclosure of information
concerning new issues, to prohibit the creation of markets in securities for which little
or no information is available, and to allow limited sales of restricted securities accord-
ing to strict rules. I To ensure adequate disclosure, Rule 144 requires the filing of
financial reports. Id § 230.144(c). To assure that purchasers have accepted the eco-
nomic risks inherent in the unregistered security, and are not acting as conduits for the
issuer, Rule 144 also mandates a two year restricted holding period from the date of
purchase of the securities from the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer. I&
§ 230.144(d) (1). Finally, to ensure that resales are "routine trading transactions," and
not distributions disguised as routine trades, Rule 144 also places tight limits on the
number of securities that can be sold in any given three month period. Id.
§ 230.144(e).
224. Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.904 (1994).
225. Wolff, supra note 4, at 141. The "issuing group" includes the issuer, distribu-
tors, affiliates thereof, and their agents. I&
226. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.904(a), 230.904(b); see supra notes 166-74 and accompany-
ing text (discussing general restrictions of Regulation S).
227. 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(a). Regulation S defines "designated offihore securities
market" in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Designated Offshore Securities Market. "Designated offshore securities
market" means:
(1) The Eurobond market, as regulated by the Association of Interna-
tional Bond Dealers; the Amsterdam Stock Exchange Ltd., the Bourse de
Bruxelles; the Frankfurt Stock Exchange; The Stock Exchange of Hong
Kong Limited, The International Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom
and the Republic of Ireland, Ltd.; theJohannesburg Stock Exchange; the
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Under Rule 904, certain officers and directors of issuers and
distributors are not considered to be members of the issuing
group. They may, therefore, resell securities of the issuer pro-
vided they pay no selling concession or fee to their distributors,
other than a standard brokers' commission, in connection with
the offer or sale.22 a In order to ensure that these resales are not
part of a scheme to avoid the Securities Act registration require-
ments, however, officers and directors of issuers may not resell
securities during the Regulation S distribution or restricted pe-
riod.
229
The resale safe harbor is also available to dealers2 ° and
other persons who have received selling concessions prior to the
expiration of any restricted period as long as they meet two con-
ditions.23 1 First, neither the seller nor his agent may know that
the offeree or purchaser of the securities is a U.S. person.23 2
The seller, however, has no affirmative duty to inquire whether
the purchaser is a U.S. person.233 Second, if the purchaser is a
dealer or person receiving a selling concession, the seller must
send to such purchaser a confirmation stating that during the
remainder of the restricted period any offers or sales of the se-
curity must be made in accordance with Regulation S, unless an-
other exemption exists. 234
Bourse de Luxembourg- the Borsa Valori di Milan; the Montreal Stock
Exchange; the Bourse de Paris; the Stockholm Stock Exchange the To-
kyo Stock Exchange; the Toronto Stock Exchange; the Vancouver Stock
Exchange; and the Zurich Stock Exchange; and
(2) Any foreign securities exchange or non-exchange market designated
by the Commission.
Id.
228. 17 C.F.R.'§ 230.904(c) (2).
229. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,319 n.139 (May 2, 1990).
230. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(12), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The
Securities Act defines "dealer" as "any person who engages either for all or part of his
time, directly or indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the business of offering,
buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another person."
Id.
231. Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.904(c) (1) (1994).
232. 17 C.F.R. § 230.904(c) (1) (i).
233. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,319 (discussing provisions of
resale safe harbor). The SEC has stated that "[t]he safe harbor does not place a duty of
inquiry on the securities professional." Id. at 18,319 n.140.
234. 17 C.F.R. § 230.904(c) (1) (ii). As was the case with the issuer safe harbor, the
confirmation need only be transmitted, not received or delivered. Adopting Release,
55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,319 n.141.
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c. The Effects of Non-Compliance with the Safe Harbor
Provisions
In keeping with the SEC's intention to open up the offshore
markets while maintaining protections against flowback, 235 the
Commission has limited the scope of Regulation S.236 The most
important restriction, the anti-evasion rule found in Preliminary
Note 2, states that Regulation S may not be used as part of a
scheme to evade the registration requirements of the Securities
Act.2 3 This general rule, which is applicable to all transactions
under Regulation S, makes it clear that fraudulent transactions
made under the aegis of the regulation will be treated as a viola-
tion of the Securities Act registration requirements. 238
The SEC detailed its positions regarding non-compliance
with the specific safe harbor provisions in the Adopting Release
("Release") .219 The Release states that the primary offering safe
harbor is lost to all persons in connection with the offering if any
member of the issuing group,24° other than officers or directors
235. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,312 (discussing criteria used for
imposing safe harbor restrictions on various types of securities).
236. See id. at 18,319 (discussing limitations on application of safe harbors).
237. See Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-230.904 prelim. n.2. Preliminary Note
2 states as follows:
In view of the objective of these rules and the policies underlying the Act,
Regulation S is not available with respect to any transaction or series of trans-
actions that, although in technical compliance with these rules, is part of a
plan or scheme to evade the registration provisions of the act. In such cases
registration under the Act is required.
Id.
238. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,319-20 (May 2, 1994). The SEC
provides two examples of actions by underwriters that would violate the anti-evasion
rule. I&. at 18,320. First, an underwriter who is in technical compliance with Regula-
tion S cannot rely on the regulation if he or she knows or is reckless in not knowing that
a dealer to whom he or she intends to sell the securities has a customer waiting to
purchase them in the United States. Id. Second, the underwriter cannot rely on Regu-
lation S if he or she knew or was reckless in not knowing that the dealer to whom he or
she intended to sell regularly resold Regulation S securities to customers in the United
States. Id.; see supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text (discussing Securities Act regis-
tration requirements).
239. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,319-20 (discussing results of
violations of safe harbors by offshore market participants). Despite the fact that these
holdings are contained in the release, rather than the rules, the courts are likely to give
them deference. Wolff, supra note 4, at 141. Courts have given deference to SEC Re-
leases in the past. See Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d 560, 565-66 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing
SEC Release 5347 as controlling); see also Johnson v. Nationwide Indus., Inc., 450 F.
Supp. 948, 953 (N.D. IMI. 1978) (using SEC Release guidelines to decide case).
240. See Wolff, supra note 4, at 141.
1995] REGULATION S
legitimately relying on the resale safe harbor, violates the offer-
ing restrictions or engages in directed selling efforts in the
United States.2 4 1 According to the SEC, this approach promotes
full compliance with all of the safe harbor conditions.242
The SEC is somewhat less strict about violations of the trans-
actional restrictions.243 If any member of the issuing group vio-
lates any of the transactional procedures of the issuer safe har-
bor, only that entity, its affiliates, and agents lose safe harbor
protection.2 1 The other members of the issuing group remain
unaffected.245 The Release also states that offshore purchasers
of Regulation S securities, or others who rely on the resale safe
harbor, are unaffected by violations of the issuer safe harbor by
members of the issuing group.24
6
Finally, Regulation S does not remove the requirement that
offshore issuers, their agents, and distributors must comply with
the antifraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws.247 Private in-
vestors, therefore, still retain the right to sue issuers, distributors,
and sellers of Regulation S securities under the antifraud statutes
of the Securities Act248 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.249 In addition, Regulation S does not prohibit the SEC
241. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,319.
242. Id.





247. Regulation S, 17 C.F.R §§ 230.901-230.904 prelim. n.1 (1994). Preliminary
Note 1 states that "the following rules relate solely to the application of Section 5 of the
Securities Act of 1933 ... and not to antifraud or other provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws." Id. The SEC has stated that "different considerations apply to the extraterri-
torial application of the antifraud provisions than to the registration provisions of the
Securities Act." Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,309 (May 2, 1990).
248. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11 (discussing civil liabilities on account of filing
of false registration statements); id. § 17 (discussing fraudulent interstate transactions);
iU § 12 (discussing private remedy for fraudulent statements or omissions of material
information in registration statement).
249. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (discussing prohi-
bition on fraudulent practices in connection with purchases or sales of securities). Sec-
tion 10(b) states as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
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from imposing administrative sanctions on, seeking injunctions
and fines against, or recommending that the U.S. District Attor-
ney prosecute individuals and organizations who make false or
misleading claims in offshore transactions. 5 °
II. REGULATION S IN OPERATION
The SEC expected that the adoption of Regulation S would
improve U.S. corporate access to, and competitiveness within,
the offshore securities markets.251 By streamlining the proce-
dures necessary to ensure compliance with the SEC's offshore
rules, Regulation S has provided greater certainty for issuers and
resellers in the planning of offshore transactions.252 Despite this
positive result, Regulation S has also reduced the ability of the
SEC to monitor offshore transactions prior to issuance because,
unlike under Release 4708, issuers are no longer compelled to
seek individual approval from the SEC for their offshore transac-
tional procedures.253 One result has been an increase in off-
shore abuses since Regulation S was adopted.25 4 This, in turn,
has increased the number of unregistered securities flowing
back into the hands of U.S. investors.255
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 101-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994)
(discussing SEC prohibition on employment of manipulative and deceptive practices in
purchases or sales of securities).
250. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,308-09 (discussing application
of antifraud provisions of Securities Act to offshore securities transactions). For a com-
prehensive discussion of Securities Fraud, see Andreas L. Ciota et al., Securities Fraud, 31
AM. Caum. L. Rv. 827 (1994).
251. R. Brandon Asbill, Securities Regulation-Great Expectations and the Reality of Rul
144A and Regulation S; The SEC's Appmach to the Internationalization of the Financial Market-
place, 21 GA.J. INT'L & Come. L. 145, 162 (1991). Richard Breeden, the chairman of
the SEC at the time Regulation S was adopted, declared that the regulation would in-
crease U.S. competitveness in offshore markets, and lower the cost of capital for U.S.
Issuers. I4
252. Coogan & Kimbrough, supra note 10, at 3.
253. See supra note 127-33 and accompanying text (discussing corporate use of no-
action process to ensure compliance with Release 4708).
254. See Cohen, supra note 18, at CI (discussing abusive use of Regulation S).
255. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's belief that there
has been substantial flowback of unregistered securities under Regulation S).
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A. How the Issuer Benefits by Selling Securities on the Offshore
Capital Markets
Prior to the adoption of Regulation S, some members of the
U.S. investment industry maintained that, due to U.S. restric-
tions on offshore securities offerings, U.S. issuers were at a disad-
vantage to their overseas counterparts in the offshore markets. 56
The compliance responsibilities imposed by Release 4708257 and
its no-action letters2 8 often meant that both the cost benefits
and time savings available to non-U.S. offshore issuers were not
available to U.S. companies.259 In addition, SEC restrictions on
resales of unregistered U.S. corporate securities by offshore in-
vestors limited the size of the offshore market for U.S. corporate
issues by restricting the liquidity of both U.S. debt and equity
securities. 260 Regulation S significantly reduced the issuer's com-
pliance responsibilities and provided a broad resale exemp-
tion,261 thereby allowing U.S. corporations to capture more of
the benefits inherent in the use of offshore funding.26 2
Use of the Regulation S procedures to raise capital in the
virtually unregulated offshore markets provides a variety of ad-
vantages that are not available with solely domestic offers and
sales.26 3 First, by using Regulation S to raise funds overseas, U.S.
corporations can reduce their cost of capital."n' Offshore issu-
256. SeeWolff, supra note 4, at 112-13 (discussing clamor by U.S. issuers and inves-
tors for relaxation of offihore application of Securities Act registration requirements).
During the 1980's a number of transnational market participants'decried the restrictive
nature of the SEC approach to the extraterritorial application of the Securities Act
registration requirements. Id. They argued that Release 4708 increased the cost of
capital for U.S. issuers. Id.
257. Release 4708, supra note 117, at 1-2.
258. See supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text (discussing compliance proce-
dures approved by SEC in no-action letters under Release 4708).
259. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text (discussing costs of offshore
issuance under Release 4708).260. See supra notes 114-26 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's expansive
approach to extraterritorial application of Securities Act prior to Regulation S).
261. See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text (discussing simplification of
offshore issuance procedures under Regulation S).
262. See Kelley & Bannister, supra note 11, at 166 (discussing benefits of using
Regulation S); see supra notes 145-234 (discussing guidelines of Regulation S); see also
M sAu.L & Ewus, supra note 5, at 78-79 (discussing benefits to corporations of using
offhore markets).
263. See Hagger, supra note 55, at 22 (discussing benefits to issuer of offshore issu-
ance).
264. Id. The most important rule of investing is that the investor should always
seek the best rate of return with the lowest risk. See BODIE, supra note 48, at 142 (dis-
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ance, especially in conjunction with a distribution in the United
States, can increase the demand for an offering, resulting in
higher prices for both debt and equity and a windffil to the is-
suer.2 5 This reduced cost of capital, however, is partially offset
by discounts that issuers must give offshore investors to compen-
sate them for the liquidity limitations imposed by the transac-
tional restrictions266 of Regulation S. 261 Second, by providing
definitive guidelines to qualify for safe harbor treatment, Regula-
tion S allows companies to avoid the high costs of requesting no-
action letters or registering.2 ' Third, Regulation S offerings en-
able companies to raise money more quickly than if registration
is required. 26 19 They also permit companies that do not want to
detail their financial condition and business plans to the domes-
tic market to raise funds discreedy.27 0 Finally, use of the offshore
markets enables a company to create an international base for its
stock,27' open up new sources of capital,272 increase the size of
cussing concepts of risk and risk aversion). Although not always the case, investing
internationally tends to entail higher risk than investing domestically. Id at 854. Inter-
national risks include exchange-rate fluctuations, restrictions on cross-border capital
flows, political risks, and differences in accounting practices from one country to an-
other. Id. As a result, offshore investors generally seek higher returns for their interna-
tional investments than they can receive at home. See, e.g., Testy, supra note 115, at 930-
31. U.S. corporate issuers can, however, reduce their cost of capital while still offering
good investment opportunites to offshore investors for two reasons. First, U.S. corpora-
tions can pay lower interest rates on debt to offshore investors than to U.S. persons
because the U.S. Internal Revenue Code exempts non-U.S. persons from witholding
taxes on interest paid on U.S. corporate debt securities. See Internal Revenue Code, 26
U.S.C. § 871(h) (1994). Second, Euromarket underwriting fees tend to be much lower
than U.S. domestic underwriting fees. Simon Brady & Matthew Ball, Don't Miss Out On
The Euro Boom, CoRp. FN., Oct. 1993, at 24. Taken together, these factors not only
enable major U.S. corporations to utilize the offshore markets to reduce their cost of
capital, but they also allow smaller U.S. companies to gain access to financing that
might not be available in the United States. Cohen, supra note 18, at Cl.
265. Hagger, supra note 55, at 22.
266. See Cohen, supra note 18, at Cl' (discussing illiquidity premiums given to pri-
mary market purchasers of Regulation S securities).
267. Charles Fleming, Europe's Fund Managers Say Offers of 'Regulation-S' Shares Are
Proiferating, WALL ST. J. EuiL, Mar. 29, 1994, at 13. Discounts to "market price" have
ranged between 9% for registered United States corporations, such as the former
Primerica Corporation (now The Travelers, Inc.), Cohen, supra note 18, at Cl, and
40% for small unknown companies. Fleming, supra note 267, at 13.




271. See Hagger, supra note 55, at 22 (discussing benefits to issuers of offshore
offerings).
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the issue,2 7 3 limit the effects of local sentiment on share
prices,274 and develop the liquidity necessary to make the offer-
ing a success on the secondary markets.2
7 5
B. The Effect of Regulation S on U.S. Corporate Involvement in the
Offshore Financial Markets
Because the offshore financial markets are largely unregu-
lated,27 6 it is nearly impossible to determine its exact size, or the
effect that Regulation S has had in increasing U.S. corporate in-
volvement in international securities issuance. 2 " The only evi-
dence, albeit circumstantial, that Regulation S has positively in-
fluenced U.S. offshore issuance is that the size of the interna-
tional bond and equity markets has greatly increased over the
last twenty years,27 8 and that this increase, especially as regards
the Euroequity markets, has accelerated since the adoption of
Regulation S.279 In fact, in 1993, ten of the top fifteen interna-
tional equity issuers were U.S. companies.280
According to a number of investment bankers and lawyers
who participate in offshore offerings, Regulation S transactions





276. See Cohen, supra note 18, at Cl (discussing lack of regulation of offshore
markets).
277. Id. It is impossible to tell exactly how many Regulation S transactions have
taken place, because no one tracks the offshore markets. Id.
278. See supra notes 28-55 and accompanying text (discussing growth of interna-
tional securities markets).
279. See Simon Brady, AU Records Smashed in 1993, CoRP. FrN., Jan. 1994, at 6 (dis-
cussing expansion of international securities market from 1992 to 1993). Offshore
bond issuance grew from US$276 billion in 1992 to US$399 bilion in 1993. Id. Off-
shore equity issuance grew at an even more rapid pace. Id. at 10. In 1992 approxi-
mately US$25 billion in equity was issued outside of issuers home markets. I& In 1993
more than US$75 billion worth of primary stock issues sold outside issuers' home coun-
tries, an all-time record. Id.
280. See id. (table showing largest corporate issuers of international equity during
1993).
281. Cohen, supra note 18, at C1. Some investment bankers involved in the off-
shore markets estimate that the Regulation S market may account for as much as five
percent of all U.S. issues since 1990. Fleming, supra note 267, at 13. One example of
the type of corporation that uses Regulation S is Work Recovery, Inc., a small, troubled
U.S. company that was able to sell US$500,000 worth of its stock to a major British
pension fund soon after the regulation was adopted. John R. Emshwiller, NeedforMone
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March 1994, European investment fund managers were being of-
fered a growing number of opportunities to purchase Regula-
tion S securities.282 The increasing use of Regulation S by U.S.
issuers can be attributed to the accepted maxim that a company
must issue outside of its domestic market in order to lower its
cost of capital and broaden its investor base. 283
C. Flowback, Evasion, and Discounting Problems Since the Adoption
of Regulation S
Although the adoption of Regulation S has increased the
number of offshore transactions involving U.S. issuers and inves-
tors,284 greater U.S. corporate access to the international mar-
kets has also brought two major problems. First, counter to the
SEC's expectations,285 flowback of unregistered securities into
the United States appears to have grown considerably over the
last five years.286 This increased flowback undermines the disclo-
sure provisions of the U.S. securities laws.287 Second, deep dis-
counting of Regulation S stock has enabled offshore investors to
use Regulation S shares to cover short sales of stock traded on
the U.S. markets. 288 The SEC did not intend to give this kind of
Pulls Young Firms Into Risky Deals, WALL ST.J., Mar. 31, 1992, at BI. Unfortunately, the
next time the same company attempted a Regulation S offering, 400,000 shares of stock
were stolen by the investment bankers it had hired. Id.
282. See Fleming, supra note 267, at 13 (discussing proliferation of Regulation S
offers in Europe).
283. Hagger, supra note 55, at 22.
284. See supra notes 276-83 and accompanying text (discussing effect that Regula-
tion S has had on U.S. issuer use of offshore markets).
285. See Proposed Rules, 53. Fed. Reg. 22,661, 22,665 (June 17, 1988) (discussing
SEC position that rules of Regulation S must ensure against indirect distribution in U.S.
markets).
286. Commissioner Robert Y. Roberts, Commission Initiatives in International
Corporate Finance, Address at the 14th Annual Northwest State Federal Provincial Se-
curities Conference 3 (Feb. 26, 1993) (transcript available from SEC). Commissioner
Roberts stated that "there are indications that reliance on the Regulation is possibly
being claimed in sham transactions that are nominally offshore but in fact are trans-
acted simply to evade registration." Id. at 3-4.
287. See Longstreth, supra note 139, at 30 (discussing whether Regulation S
achieves purported goals of SEC). The SEC views flowback of unregistered U.S. corpo-
rate securities as a significant enough threat to the Securities Act disclosure scheme to
warrant stringent restrictions on offshore issuance. Id.
288. See Cohen, supra note 18, at Cl (discussing use of Regulation S shares to
cover short sales of U.S. listed stock); see also Thomas N. Cochran, The Striking Pice:
Expiration Wednesday, BARRON'S, Apr. 5, 1993, at 68 (discussing effect of Regulation S
offering on share price of Primerica stock).
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advantage to international investors.289
1. How Flowback Undermines the Investor Protections
Contained in the Securities Act
Like any U.S. sale to the public of non-exempt, 29 0 unregis-
tered securities, flowback of non-exempt Category Two securities
is inconsistent with the protective intent of the Securities Act,
because it enables U.S. reporting companies to avoid disclo-
sure. 2 9 1 As a result, although reporting companies must provide
regular information to U.S. investors, the information available
to the public at the time a Category Two security2 92 flows back
into the United States may not be current.293 In addition, by
allowing unrestrained flowback of Category Two securities, the
SEC may unintentionally encourage reporting companies to util-
ize Regulation S to avoid registration. 94 Flowback of Category
Three securities295 poses even more of a problem, because the
average U.S. investor is unlikely to have any access to informa-
tion concerning Category Three issuers.29 6 Therefore, unsophis-
ticated U.S. investors may once again become victims of unscru-
ptilous securities dealers, as was the case prior to 1933.
289. See Cohen, supra note 18, at Cl (discussing SEC response to use of Regulation
S shares by European investors to cover short sales of U.S. listed stock).
290. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing two statutory exemptions
from registration available to issuers and other sellers or securities).
291. Longstreth, supra note 139, at 30; see Proposed Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,661,
22,662 (June 17, 1988) (discussing coming to rest abroad doctrine).
292. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing securities covered by
Category Two of Regulation S).
293. See Proposed Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,661, 22,664 n. 53 (discussing disclosure
requirements under Exchanke Act). Reporting companies need only file quarterly, 17
C.F.R. § 249.308(a) (1994), and annual reports. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1994).
294. See Roberts, supra note 286, at 4 (discussing SEC concerns about illicit use of
Regulation S). There is evidence that some issuers may be using Regulation S solely to
wash restrictions off the securities before bringing them back to the United States. Id.
This method is quite tempting for issuers who want to sell in the United States while
avoiding the costs of registration. Id.
295. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing securities included in
Category Three of issuer safe harbor).
296. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,318 (May 2, 1990).
297. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text (discussing fraud perpetrated
on investors by securities issuers and dealers prior to adoption of Securities Act disclo-
sure regime).
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2. Evidence and Methods of Flowback in the Regulation S Era
Despite clear guidelines prohibiting the use of Regulation S
to avoid registration,298 many issuers, particularly small compa-
nies encouraged by their investment bankers,2 99 have utilized
the Regulation S facility to raise funds with full knowledge that
their securities are likely to flow back to the United States imme-
diately following the expiration of the applicable restricted pe-
riod. °0 Furthermore, the SEC believes that many of these same
corporations are beginning to use Regulation S under the mis-
taken belief that the exemption wipes off all resale restric-
tions.30 1 According to Commissioner Robert Y. Roberts of the
SEC, sham transactions have occurred under both the primary
offering and resale safe harbors.3 0 2 Not only do these transac-
tions constitute a violation of the prohibition on indirect distri-
butions into the United States, 03 but they also run counter to
the principle that Regulation S was primarily intended to be
used by large, financially-sound U.S. companies to place their
securities with long-term offshore investors. 0 4
There are two mechanisms through which flowback of Reg-
ulation S securities into the United States may occur. First, off-
shore purchasers can resell their securities to U.S. persons in the
United States either prior to or after the expiration of the Regu-
lation S mandatory restricted period, or any further restricted
period contained in the agreement between the purchaser and
the issuer. 05 In the case of equity securities, this type of resale
298. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text (discussing prohibition against
use of Regulation S as part of scheme to avoid registration under Securities Act).
299. See Cohen, supra note 18, at CI (discussing U.S. corporate use of Regulation
S). Onyx, a small investment bank in Miami, tells reporting companies that they can
avoid registration by issuing offshore at a discount to market price. Id.
300. See supra notes 286-89 (discussing SEC concerns about flowback of Regulation
S securities).
301. See Roberts, supra note 286, at 4 (discussing SEC fears of misuse of Regulation
S by U.S. issuers).
302. Roberts, supra note 286, at 3-4.
303. 1&
304. See Cohen, supra note 18, at Cl (discussing reasons behind SEC development
of Regulation S).
305. See, e.g.; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Westdon Holding & Invest-
ment, Inc. et al., Litigation Release No. 13,263, 1992 WL 136673 (S.E.C.) (June 5, 1992)
(discussing attempt by offshore investor to sell Regulation S shares to U.S. persons prior
to expiration of restricted period). Regulation S shares may not be resold in the United
States absent registration or a valid exemption, because resales under the offshore ex-
emption provided by Regulation S must be made in an offshore transaction. 17 C.F.R.
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cannot occur without the knowledge of the issuer because stock
can only be transferred on the books of a corporation. 06 If the
securities do not qualify for an exemption that permits resale
into the United States, such as the non-underwriter exemption
of Section 4(1) of the Securities Act3e 7 or the exemption for sales
to sophisticated investors contained in Rule 144A,3 °s the resale is
illegal, and may subject the offshore investor to SEC sanctions.30 9
The second method by which Regulation S securities can
flow back into the United States is a two-step process. First, an
offshore purchaser sells Regulation S securities to a U.S. person
on a valid offshore market.31 0 This is legal as long as the transfer
of ownership occurs after the expiration of any restricted pe-
riod. 1 The second step occurs when the U.S. purchaser, in reli-
ance on the non-underwriter exemption from registration con-
tained in Section 4(1)312 of the Securities Act, legally resells the
unregistered Regulation S securities in the U.S. over-the-counter
markets13 or on a U.S. public securities exchange, such as the
New York Stock Exchange. 14
§ 230.904(a); see supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text (discussing concepts of "off-
shore transaction" and "directed selling efforts").
306. See Lws D. SOLOMON ET AL, CORPORATIONS: LAW AN Poucy 439-40 (3d ed.
1994) (discussing composition of shareholder list). "A corporations records must list
only the names of persons holding legal title to outstanding shares of stock." id. at 439.
307. See su=pra note 82 (discussing exemption contained in Section 4(1) of Securi-
ties Act).
308. Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1994). Once the restricted period has ex-
pired, Rule 144A allows the offihore purchaser to resell his stock to certain U.S. institu-
tional investors without registration of the securities under the Securities Act. Fred A.
little, Regulation S and Rule 144A, C895 AUI-ABA 445, 447 (1994).
309. See supra notes 106-12 (discussing investigatory and sanctioning powers of
SEC).
310. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing ability of U.S. purchas-
ers to buy Regulation S securities on offshore markets under certain circumstances).
311. See supra notes 213-34 and accompanying text (discussing Regulation S resale
safe harbor).
312. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see supra
notes 219-21 and accompanying text (discussing Section 4(1) of Securities Act).
313. See HAMILTON, supra note 47, at 538. The over-the-counter market consists of
a group of broker-dealers, linked to each other through a computer network, who trade
with each other, or for clients, without using the facilities of an organized securities
exchange. Id.
314. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1). The non-underwriter exemption states that
"[t]he provisions of section 5 shall not apply to transactions by any person other than
an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." Id. Under this exemption, U.S. persons who validly
purchase Regulation S securities on an authorized offshore market can resell those se-
curities in the United States as long as they can prove that they did not purchase from
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3. An Attempt to Use Regulation S Evasively
In SEC v. Westdon Holding & Investment, et al.,15 the SEC
obtained a consensual permanent injunction against one of the
defendants, Kishore J. Shah ("Shah"), a U.K. citizen, enjoining
him from further violations of Regulation S.316 According to the
SEC, Shah had been involved in the purchase and illegal resale
of Regulation S shares of Work Recovery, Inc., a U.S. company
headquartered in Tuscon, Arizona.""7 As part of the purchase
agreement, the defendant had agreed to hold the shares for five
years, during which time the senior officers of the issuing corpo-
ration retained a repurchase option.318 The complaint alleged
that immediately after consummating the transaction the de-
fendant embarked on a scheme to sell the shares to unsuspect-
ing U.S. investors in violation of the Securities Act registration
requirements, thereby reaping illegal proceeds totaling
US$380,000. 19 Des 'ite agreeing to return the unsold shares,
Shah was not forced to return the illegal proceeds,32 0 and his
U.S. based assets, which had been frozen, were unfrozen upon
his consent to the injunction. 21
Although there is evidence that evasive use of Regulation S
has become common, Westdon is the only enforcement action for
violations of Regulation S undertaken by the SEC since the
adoption of the regulation. 22 The SEC, however, may now be
ready to take action to correct the evasion problem. Members of
the Commission and its staff have recently announced that use
of Regulation S to wash off restrictions or otherwise evade the
the issuer with a view to distribute the securities, and did not offer to sell the shares in
connection with a distribution. JENNNGs, supra note 1, at 512. Although this type of
flowback is permitted by the Securities Laws, one must question whether, especially as
regards Category Three securities, the holding periods currently mandated by Regula-
tion S are long enough to protect unsophisticated U.S. investors by providing some
assurance that the issuer will not become insolvent soon after the flowback occurs.
315. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Westdon Holding & Investment, Inc.





320. Id at 2.
321. Id.
322. Telephone Interview with Michael Hyatt, SEC Office of International Finance
(Sept. 22, 1994).
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registration requirements will not be tolerated. 23 The Commis-
sion has also intimated that it will soon bring cases against a
number of individuals and companies for Regulation S viola-
tions.3 24 Furthermore, the SEC recently stated that it is currently
revisiting the regulation to determine if changes are war-
ranted. 25
4. The Discount Effect: How Unintentional Arbitrage
Opportunities Promote Flowback
Corporate actions that contain material information affect
the market price of a corporation's stock. 26 Consequently, a de-
cision by a reporting corporation to sell stock is often construed
as a negative development by the market.3 27 This information,
combined with the actual sale of the stock, may drive the price of
the stock downwards.328 Because issuers need not announce a
Regulation S distribution prior to the offer and sale, 29 the mar-
ket does not take this hidden information into account and,
therefore, the stock price does not adjust accordingly.330 This
market inefficiency enables offshore investors to engage in pure
arbitrage 331 by using discounted Regulation S shares of report-
ing U.S. companies to cover short sales3 3 2 of the same stock
323. See Roberts, supra note 286, at 4 (discussing SEC concerns about misuse of
Regulation S). In February 1993, Commissioner Roberts warned potential violators
they should not "be surprised when [they] receive a call from the SEC's enforcement
division." Id. In early 1994, Bill McLucas, Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement,
stated that his department will begin to investigate Regulation S transactions. SECDivi-
sion of Corporate hnance Ep ese Concerns, INsimtrrs, Apr. 1994, at 36.
324. See Cohen, supra note 18, at C1 (discussing SEC investigations of Regulation S
violations).
325. Telephone Interview with Michael Hyatt, SEC Office of International Finance
(Sept. 22, 1994). As of this writing, the SEC has yet to officially follow through on its
pronouncements.
326. CHRmw A. BREAt" & STEwART C. MWEMS, PMuNcnLMS OF CORPORATE FNANCE
916 (4th ed. 1991).
327. Id. at 307-08.
328. Id. at 308.
329. See Cochran, supra note 288, at 68 (discussing SEC view that U.S. issuers need
not announce Regulation S offerings in United States).
330. See BODIE, supra note 48, at G5 (discussing efficient market hypothesis). In an
efficient market the price of securities reflects available information. Id.; see MASHML
& ELuis, supra note 5, at 166-67 (discussing validity of efficient market hypothesis).
331. See BLA:cK's LAw DicnoNRt 104 (6th ed. 1990). Arbitrage is defined as
"[t]he simultaneous purchase in one market and sale in another of a security or corn-
modity in hope of making a profit on price differences in the different markets." Id.
332. See BornE, supra note 48, at 99-101 (discussing concept of short sales). In a
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listed on U.S. securities exchanges."' 3 Regulation S, in effect,
grants offshore investors a guaranteed profit that is not available
to U.S. investors because U.S. investors cannot participate in a
Category Two Regulation S offering."'
An example of this phenomenon occurred in April 1993
when Primerica, now Travelers, Inc., sold seven million shares in
a Regulation S offering without informing its domestic share-
holders.13 5 The shares were sold at a nine percent discount to
the market price,s s and the day after the offering was com-
pleted, after U.S. traders"5 7 had heard rumors that the Regula-
tion S distribution had occurred,s3 8 the stock fell from
US$46.125 to US$42.75 on triple its average daily volume.3s 9
During this trading session, in response to a request from the
New York Stock Exchange, Primerica announced that it had sold
shares pursuant to Regulation S.340 Because the offer and sale
short sale, an investor sells borrowed securities in the belief that the price of the bor-
rowed securities will decline. Id. at 99. Later, the borrower replaces the securities with
new shares. Id. If the share price has declined during the interim, the borrower profits
from the difference between the price of the securities at the time they were initially
borrowed and sold, and the market price of the replacement shares. Id. at 100.
333. See Cohen, supra note 18, at Cl (discussing European investors' ability to lock-
in profits by using Regulation S stock to cover short sales of U.S. listed stock).
334. See supra notes 175-213 and accompanying text (discussing issuer safe harbor
procedures of Regulation S). U.S. persons cannot participate in Regulation S offerings
due to the restricted periods imposed on offshore offers and sales of Category Two
shares. Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 903(c) (2) (1994).
335. See Cochran, supra note 288, at 68 (discussing European investors' use of Reg-
ulation S shares to cover U.S. short sales of Primerica stock). A similar type of profit
lock-in probably took place in September 1994. Thomas Cochran, The Striking Price: A
Rush For Conversions, BAMRON'S, Sept. 26, 1994, at MW13 [hereinafter Conversions]. In
that case, offihore investors bought options to put shares of a small U.S. company
called Interactive Network from investors in the United States. Id. A put option allows
its holder to sell certain securities at a specified price within a specific time period.
BoDJE, supra note 48, at 619. One of the market-makers on the Chicago Board Options
Exchange believes that the buyers bought the put options to lock-in profits on shares of
Interactive Network that they had bought at a discount in a Regulation S offering. Con-
versions at MW13.
336. Cohen, supra note 18, at Cl.
337. See MARSHAL. & ELLs, supra note 5, at 141-70 (discussing trading practices).
A trader is a professional investor who takes, buys, and sells financial instruments in
order to earn profits from price changes or a discrepancy in prices asked or offered on
different securities markets. I& at 141.
338. Cochran, supra note 288, at 68.
339. Id.
340. Id. Primerica only announced its sale of Regulation S stock after being pres-
sured by the New York Stock Exchange. Id. Primerica stated that it did not announce
the Regulation S distribution prior to the completion of the offer and sale because it
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had already been completed, however, it was too late to prevent
European investors who had subscribed to the offering from us-
ing the discounted Regulation S shares to cover their short
sales.3 41 The European investors were, therefore, able to turn a
large, guaranteed profit that was not available to U.S. inves-
tors.
3 4 2
The use of Regulation S shares by offshore investors to
cover short sales of securities sold on U.S. markets poses three
problems for U.S. securities market regulators. First, it provides
an unfair advantage to non-U.S. investors and, thereby, leads to
flowback s43 Second, offshore investors' use of Regulation S
shares to cover short sales may amount to insider trading.34 Fi-
nally, the ability of U.S. corporations to avoid announcing Regu-
lation S offerings, which enables offshore investors to undertake
theses short sale schemes, makes U.S. markets less efficient.3 4
believed that doing so would violate the prohibition against "directed selling efforts" in
the United States. Id.; see supra notes 169-73 (discussing prohibition on directed selling
efforts contained in Regulation S).
341. See Cohen, supra note 18, at Cl (discussing European investors' use of Regula-
tion S shares to cover U.S. short sales of Primerica stock).
342. Id.
343. See supra notes 327-42 (discussing deleterious effects of use of Regulation S
shares by offshore investors to cover short sales of U.S. listed stock).
344. See Convenions, supra note 335; at MW13 (discussing possibility that use of
Regulation S shares to cover U.S. short sales may be insider trading). The theory of
fraud on the market, which was adopted by the Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
holds that, if markets are efficient, investors have the right to rely on the integrity of the
market price. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (discussing and applying
theory of "fraud on the market" to insider trading). By accepting the theory of "fraud
on the market," the Supreme Court drastically expanded the extent of the securities
fraud action for investors who had been induced to sell or purchase securities through
mistatements made by the other party to the purchase or sale. Johnathan R. Macey et
al., Fraud on Inefficient Markets: An Economic and Legal Analysis of a Plaintiff's Right
to an Unbiased Market Price i (Feb. 19, 1991) (on file with the NewYork University Law
Library). The authors argue that, even on inefficient markets, investors are entitled to
an unbiased estimate of a security's fundamental value. Id. at 3.
345. See Mark S. Bergman & Christine M. Alvarez, SECAnnouncesAdditionalInterna-
tionalInitiatives, INsIGMHs,June 1994, at 29 (discussing issuers' concerns that Regulation
S' prohibition against directed selling efforts prevents them from updating investors
about material developments).
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III. ENFORCEMENT OF THtE SECURITIES ACT REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE REGULATION S
REGIME: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL
SOLUTIONS
The SEC's adoption of Regulation S in 1990 has benefitted
issuers, but harmed the U.S. disclosure regime. On one hand, it
has increased the capability of U.S. corporations to compete for
capital in the international financial markets. 34 6 On the other
hand, Regulation S has made it more difficult for the SEC to
track offshore distributions, because issuers no longer feel com-
pelled to request no-action approval each time they issue securi-
ties offshore.3 47 In addition, Regulation S has increased unscru-
pulous companies' use of the offshore markets to evade registra-
tion,3 48 and significantly lowered the general level of protection
against flowback that had previously been the touchstone of SEC
policy on offshore issuance and sales3 49 After four years of Reg-
ulation S, it has become clear that its procedures cause, rather
than inhibit, flowback, S0 and that Preliminary Note 2 35 limits
the effectiveness of Regulation S as a planning tool for reputable
346. See supra notes 256-62 and accompanying text (discussing how Regulation S
has increased U.S. issuer access to offshore markets).
347. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. issuers' sense
that, prior to adoption of Regulation S, they had to seek approval from SEC of their
offshore issuance procedures for each offshore offering to prevent imposition of sanc-
tions); see also J. William Hicks, Securities Regulation: Challenges in the Decades Ahead; 68
IND. LJ. 791, 804 (1993) (discussing problems in international enforcement of U.S.
securities laws).
348. See supra notes 298-304 and accompanying text (discussing evidence of evasive
use of Regulation S).
349. See supra notes 115-33 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's approach to
offshore application of Securities Act registration requirements prior to adoption of
Regulation S). Since the SEC began soliciting comment letters prior to adopting new
rules and regulations two decades ago, it has become much more responsive to the
concerns of issuers, investment banks and brokers, its most vocal constituency. Aptly
demonstrating this responsiveness is the fact that the commission initially proposed a
restricted period of 90 days for all securities in Category Two, and 90 days for debt
securities in Category Three. Proposed Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,661, 22,670-72 (June 17,
1988) (discussing safe harbor restricted periods as initially proposed). After receiving
139 comment letters, however, the SEC finally adopted the significantly shorter period
of 40 days for those securities. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,307 nn.3, 5
(May 2, 1990); see supra notes 195-213 and accompanying text (discussing transactional
restrictions imposed by issuer safe harbor provisions).
350. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (defining flowback).
351. See supra note 237 and accompanying text (discussing Preliminary Note 2).
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U.S. companies that wish to sell their securities offshore.352 Due
to resource constraints, neither SEC enforcement, nor currently
existing private remedies, can solve the flowback problems.3 53 In
order to bring Regulation S into line with the protective intent
of the Securities Act and provide greater certainty for issuers, the
SEC must turn the regulation into a self-enforcing mecha-
nism. 54 The Commission can make a number of changes in the
rules to achieve this aim. These revisions include longer safe-
harbor restricted periods, the imposition of more stringent
transactional restrictions on issuers and offshore purchasers s55
the provision of an effective private remedy for U.S. buyers of
Regulation S securities,3 56 and the repeal of Preliminary Note2.357
A4 Why the Restrictions Imposed by Regulation S Encourage Flowback
Regulation S was structured to limit flowback and to pro-
mote offers and sales primarily to long-term offshore investors
through the imposition of various offering and transactional re-
strictions.3 5 8 Unfortunately, the restrictions appear to have done
little to dissuade international investors from reselling their
shares to U.S. persons,3 59 with or without a valid exemption, as
352. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (discussing and defining "com-
ing to rest").
353. See Hicks, supra note 347, at 803 (discussing effect that limited resources will
have on SEC's ability to enforce securities laws in future). Lack of resources will ham-
per the SEC's ability to do its job properly. M. Therefore, the success of offshore en-
forcement is contingent upon adequate funding by the U.S. Congress. Id. With the
new Republican majority in place, it is more likely than not that the U.S. Congress will
curtail securities industry regulation. See generally Diana B. Henriques, Republicans May
Hold Down the S.RC. and Investor Suits, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 1994, at Al.
354. For Regulation S to become "self-enforcing," it must contain rules which
place a greater onus on Regulation S issuers and investors to prevent violations of the
safe harbor procedures. New rules must also make it easier for the SEC to follow the
movement of Regulation S securities than is presently possible.
355. See supra notes 195-213 and accompanying text (discussing transactional re-
strictions imposed under issuer safe harbor provisions).
356. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text (discussing private remedy cur-
rently available under § 12(1) of Securities Act).
357. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text (discussing Preliminary Note 2
to Regulation S).
358. See Cohen, supra note 18, at Cl (discussing SEC's reasons for adopting Regu-
lation S); see supra notes 195-213 and accompanying text (discussing transactional re-
strictions imposed by issuer safe harbor provisions).
359. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing concept of U.S. person
under Regulation S and Release 4708). The concept of"U.S. person" under Regulation
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soon as the various restricted periods have expired.3 60 This type
of flowback, especially of Category Three securities, is the result
of the SEC's abrogation of its duty, mandated by the Securities
Act, to protect U.S. investors. 61
1. The Paradox of the Issuer Safe Harbors
Both the Category Two and Category Three safe harbors3 62
restrict resales of Regulation S securities for a period of time af-
ter the completion of a Regulation S offering.163 These restric-
tions, however, give only short-term protection to U.S. investors.
Because the restrictions imposed on offshore offers and sales
force U.S. issuers to sell overseas at a discount to the U.S. market
price for the securities, ' the regulation actually encourages in-
vestors in Category Two securities365 to sell their holdings imme-
diately upon the expiration of the restricted period in order to
lock in profits.36 6 Due to the fact that local markets remain the
greatest source of demand for the securities of their own na-
tion's companies, 67 the U.S. domestic market provides the most
likely arena for offshore purchasers of Regulation S securities to
S includes U.S. citizens and residents anywhere in the world during the restricted peri-
ods. See Proposed Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 22, 661, 22,665 (June 17, 1988). Coincident with
the SEC's new geographic approach to offshore application of the Securities Act, the
Regulation S concept of "U.S. person" includes only people in the United States once
the restricted periods have expired. Id.
360. Sw supra notes 298-304 and accompanying text (discussing evidence of evasive
use of Regulation S).
361. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text (discussing purpose behind en-
actment of Securities Act).
362. See supra notes 175-213 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions on off-
shore issance and sales imposed by Category Two and Three safe harbors).
363. See supra notes 195-213 and accompanying text (discussing transactional re-
strictions imposed by issuer safe harbor provisions).
364. See supra note 267 and accompanying text (discussing discounted pricing of
Regulation S securities).
365. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text (describing securities included
in Category Two).
366. See supra notes 335-42 and accompanying text (discussing use of Regulation S
stock to cover short sales of listed securities). The discounts almost automatically lock
in profits for Regulation S investors by providing a guaranteed spread between their
cost and the U.S. market price. See supra notes 327-34 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing how use of Regulation S shares to cover short sales allows offshore investors to lock-
in profits).
367. See U.S. DEPARTmT OF COMMRCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED
STATES 1994 527 (tbl. 811) (1994). New Securities offerings by U.S. Corporations to-
talled US$339.1 billion in 1990. IM International equity and bond offerings totalled
only US$249 billion in 1990. GoLDsrmn, supra note 42, this. 6-7.
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resell them. 6
Whereas flowback of Category Two securities is not particu-
larly onerous, flowback of Category Three securities represents a
direct attack on the protective intent of the disclosure system.369
Even accepting the notion that, despite the potential problems,
non-reporting7 0 U.S. corporations should be allowed to offer
their securities on the offshore markets, 71 the relatively short
restricted periods of the Category Three safe harbor do not coin-
cide with the SEC's goal to promote long-term offshore invest-
ment in U.S. companies. 72 Furthermore, the short restricted
periods provide a window of opportunity for offshore purchas-
ers, through unscrupulous or unknowledgeable U.S. brokers, to
sell Regulation S securities to unsophisticated U.S. investors .3 7
In addition to the current flowback problems caused by
Regulation S, the short 40-day and one-year restricted periods
contained in Catgory Three of the issuer safe harbor is inconsis-
tent with the SEC's position, contained in Securities Act Rule
144,'7 4 that informed purchasers of unregistered securities must
assume the economic risks of their investment. 75 Rule 144's
embodiment of this philosophy is the two-year holding period it
prescribes for securities bought by investors in reliance on the
private placement exemption. 7 6 In contrast, Regulation S, by
allowing resale of unregistered securities to U.S. persons on the
day immediately following the expiration of the one year re-
368. See STATISTICAL ASRACT, supra note 367, at 527 (tbl. 811).
369. See supra notes 290-97 (discussing why flowback undermines protective intent
of Securities Act).
370. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (defining reporting issuer).
371. See supra notes 284-344 and accompanying text (discussing problems caused
by adoption of Regulation S).
372. Cohen, supra note 18, at Cl.
373. See supra notes 73-86 (discussing history and purpose of Securities Act).
374. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144.
375. See id. prelim. n. (discussing philosophy underlying Rule 144). The prelimi-
nary note to Rule 144 states as follows:
A holding period prior to resale is essential ... to assure that those persons
who buy under a claim of a Section 4(2) [Private Placement] exemption have
assumed the economic risks of investment, and therefore are not acting as
conduits for sale to the public of unregistered securities, directly or indirectly,
on behalf of an issuer.
Id.
376. See supra notes 222-23 (discussing restrictions on resales of privately placed
securities contained in Rule 144).
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stricted period,3 7" enables offshore investors to cut the economic
risks they would have to accept under Rule 144 at least in half.
Furthermore, Regulation S, unlike Rule 144, does not mandate
that material financial information be available prior to the re-
sale of the unregistered securities.7 8
Despite the fact that there is little substantive difference be-
tween Regulation S securities and privately placed securities,
there is a great difference in the way they are sold. 7 9 Under
Regulation D, offers and sales of privately placed securities ex-
ceeding US$5 million may not be made to the general public,B°
377. 17 C.FR. § 230.903(c) (3).
378. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-230.904. The availability of Rule 144 is predicated on
the availability of adequate public information regarding the issuing company. 17
C.F.R. § 230.114 prelim. n.
379. See supra notes 140-250 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Reg-
ulation S); see alsoJENNiNGs, supra note 1, at 322-76 (discussing private placement mech-
anisms).
380. Regulation D - Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities
without Registration under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.508
(1994). Rule 506(b) (2) (ii) states as follows:
Each purchaser who is not an accredited investor either alone or with his pur-
chaser representative(s) [must have] such knowledge and experience in finan-
cial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks
of the prospective investment, or the issuer reasonably believes immediately
prior to making any sale that such purchaser comes within this description.
IM. § 230.506(b) (2) (ii). Regulation D defines "accredited investor" as follows:
(a) "Accredited investor" shall mean any person who comes within any of the
following categories, or who the issuer reasonably believes comes within any of,
the following categories, at the time of the sale of the securities to that person:
(1) Any bank.., or any savings and loan association ... ; any broker or
dealer registered pursuant to section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934; any insurance company... ; any investment company ... ; any
Small Business Investment Company licensed by the U.S. Small Business
Administration .. . ; any [government pension plan], if such plan has
total assets in excess of $5,000,000; any employee benefit plan within the
meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, if the
investment decision is made by a plan fiduciary... or registered invest-
ment adviser... ;
(2) Any private business development company as defined in section
202(a) (22) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; ...
(4) Any director, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer of the
securities being offered or sold, or any director, executive officer, or gen-
eral partner of a general partner of that issuer,
(5) Any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth
with that person's spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000;
(6) Any natural person who had an individual income in excess of
$200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with that
person's spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a
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must not be sold to more than thirty-five persons, 381 and must
not be offered, sold, or resold unless material information sub-
stantially the same as that required in a registered public offer-
ing is provided to all non-accredited38 2 purchasers.38 3 Regula-
tion S, on the other hand, places few limits on the type of pur-
chasers to whom securities can be sold, no limits on the number
of purchasers, and no requirement that material information be
made available to those purchasers. 8 4 Regulation *S securities
can, therefore, be distributed and resold far more quickly, easily,
and widely than the same security if it is privately placed.38 5
Private placements have historically been the primary mech-
anism for offerings of the unregistered securities of private com-
386panies. Because, however, the SEC's private placement proce-
dures place significantly greater limitations on sales of securities
than does the current Regulation S,3 87 the danger now exists
that many non-reporting U.S. companies will begin to use Regu-
lation S as an alternative to private placements. There are no
limits on the number of offshore investors who can participate in
a Regulation S offering,388 and no restrictions on the number of
Regulation S shares that offshore purchasers can resell to U.S.
persons in offshore transactions. Therefore, Regulation S cre-
ates the potential for virtually unlimited flowback of unregis-
reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current
year,
(7) Any trust, with total assets in excess of $5,000,000...;
(8) Any entity in which all of the equity owners are accredited investors.
Id. § 230.501(a).
381. Id. § 230.506(b) (2) (i). The issuer need only reasonably believe that it is sell-
ing to no more than thirty-five persons to comply with this rule. Id.
382. See supra note 380 (defining accredited investor).
383. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (discussing information requirements under Regu-
lation D); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) prelim. n. (discussing information require-
ments for resales of privately placed securities under Rule 144).
384. See supra notes 140-250 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Reg-
ulation S).
385. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text (discussing the limitatiolis on
resales of privately placed securities imposed by SEC Rule 144).
386. SeeJeffrey B. Tevis, Asset-Backed Securities: Secondaty Market Implications Of SEC
Rule 144A And Regulation S, 23 PAc. LJ. 135, 153 (1991). In 1989, 2407 U.S. issuers
privately placed over US$169 billion worth of securities. Id. tbl. 3.
387. See supra notes 375-84 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions on issu..
ance and resale of privately placed securities).
388. Seesupra notes 185-213 and accompanying text (discussing offering and trans-
actional restrictions of Regulation S).
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tered U.S. corporate securities in the near future.38 9 In order to
defend the disclosure regime created by the Securities Act and
the Securities Exchange Act, the SEC must not allow the private
placement market to be supplanted by the Regulation S market.
2. Potential Misuse of the Resale Safe Harbor
Although the resale safe harbor390 does not allow officers
and directors to serve as conduits for transactions by persons not
authorized to utilize the resale safe harbor, 91 it provides a
tempting loophole in the registration requirements by allowing
unrestricted offshore sales on secondary markets.3 92 As a result,
careful directors and officers of non-reporting companies can
sell their securities in offshore transactions, and those securities,
unlike offers under the issuer safe harbor, can immediately flow
back to the United States in full compliance with the offshore
exemption.'-' Even .small indirect distributions by officers of
U.S. corporations may open up a Pandora's box of threats to the
registration regime and, by extension, the disclosure system de-
veloped by the SEC. 94
B. Why Private Remedies and Stepped-Up SEC Enforcement Will Not
Solve the Flowback Problem
The SEC Division of Enforcement 95 ("Enforcement") has
389. See supra notes 305-14 and accompanying text (discussing methods of
flowback).
390. Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.904 (1994).
391. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,319 (May 2, 1990) (discussing
limits on use of resale safe harbor by corporate officers).
392. See supra notes 214-34 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of resale
safe harbor). The resale safe harbor is available for the offshore sale of any security, not
just Regulation S securities. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,319.
393. See supra notes 305-14 and accompanying text (discussing methods through
which Regulation S securities can flow back into United States). The safe harbors are
not exclusive, and do not affect the availability of any other exemption from the regis-
tration requirements of the Securities Act. Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306-08.
394. See supra notes 290-97 (discussing why flowback threatens Securities Act dis-
closure regime).
395. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTIrG OnmcE, STATISTICS ON SEC's ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM 1-3 (1985) (discussing structure and methods of SEC Division of Enforce-
ment). The Enforcement Division of the Securities Exchange Commission consists of
attorneys whose job is to investigate potential violations of the U.S. securities laws and
regulations and bring suit, either administratively or in federal court, against those
found to be in violation. 1&; see supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text (discussing
statutory basis for SEC enforcement activities).
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begun to sci-utinize Regulation S distributions much more
closely over the past year than it had in the first three years the
regulation was in effect.3 96 Despite this heightened level of in-
vestigatory interest, the SEC has not brought a case for a Regula-
tion S violation since Westdon 97 in 1990.98 Due to the difficulty
of both discovering and proving that a Regulation S violation has
occurred, neither enforcement by the SEC399 nor the private
remedy granted by Securities Act section 12(1)400 are likely to be
effective in ameliorating the flowback problem.
1. The Difficulties Confronting the Securities and Exchange
Commission in Regard to Offshore Enforcement
Actions
There are three major reasons why SEC enforcement meas-
ures will not deter flowback of Regulation S securities. First, the
SEC's enforcement resources are limited. ° Furthermore, over
the last decade, the SEC has considered enforcement of the re-
gistration laws of secondary importance to the battle against in-
sider trading and broker/dealer violations. 0 2 Second, because
neither Regulation S issuers nor offshore investors need to re-
396. Telephone Interview with Michael Hyatt, SEC Office of International Finance
(Sept. 22, 1994).
397. See supra notes 315-21 and accompanying text (discussing facts and results of
Westdon case).
398. Telephone Interview with Michael Hyatt, SEC Office of International Finance
(Sept. 22, 1994). t
399. See Hicks, supra note 347, at 804 (discussing difficulty of international en-
forcement of U.S. securities laws). International enforcement brings with it a multiplic-
ity of problems, including issues concerning gathering of evidence, service of process,
freezing of overseas assets, and enforcement of U.S. judgments against offshore viola-
tors. Id.
400. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771-1; see supra notes 100-05 and
accompanying text (discussing private remedy granted by Section 12(1) of Securities
Act).
401. See Hicks, supra note 347, at 802-03 (discussing whether SEC enforcement
resources will be sufficient to deal with regulation of international transactions).
402. See Harvey L Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation By Enforcement: A
Look Ahead At The Next Decade, 7 YALEJ. oN REo. 149, 200-01 (1990). Throughout the
1980's, insider trading was the primary focus of the SEC Division of Enforcement. Id.
Since the beginning of this decade, the SEC has utilized its resources primarily to attack
insider trading, financial fraud and other similar reporting violations, market manipula-
tion, and securities offering violations. William R. McLucas et al., SEC Enforcement: A
Look At The Curret Program And Thoughts About The 1990s, in 2 23RD ANNUAL INSTITUrE
ON SECURITIES REGULATION, at 283, 285 (PLI Corp. L Practice Course Handbook Series
No. B4-6978, 1991). It is hard, however, to determine what priority the SEC will give to
enforcement of offering violations in the 1990's. Ld. at 308.
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port offshore sales to the SEC, it is extremely difficult for the
Commission to monitor the legality of Regulation S deals.4 "
Third, in order to win sanctions for a Preliminary Note 2 viola-
tion, which entails the use of Regulation S as part of a scheme to
evade the Securities Act registration requirements, 40 4 the SEC
must prove intent.405 Because it is difficult for Enforcement to
develop evidence if the transaction occurs outside of the United
States, as long as the parties to an offshore deal conform to the
requirements of Regulation S the SEC will have great difficulty
collecting proof that the parties to the transaction intentionally
used the regulation in an evasive manner.40 8 These constraints
limit the SEC's ability to operate effectively in the international
arena. Therefore, Regulation S must be amended to help the
SEC track the movement of Regulation S securities.
Use of Regulation S to evade the registration rules will
rarely be as apparent as in the Wetdon case.40 7 As a result, even
if Enforcement discovers evidence that a Regulation S violation
has occurred, the SEC will generally find it either impossible or
403. See Richard M. Phillips et al., The Internationalization of Securities Fraud Enforce-
ment in the 1990s, in 2 23xD ANNUAL INSTsrrTE ON SECURITIES RE=uLArIoN, at 381, 385
(PLI Corp. L. Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-6978, 1991) (discussing ability
of participants in offshore transactions to hide their identities from SEC). It is ex-
tremely difficult for the SEC to enforce U.S. securities laws in the context of interna-
tional fraud for a number of reasons. I. at 386-88. First, obtaining subject matter or
personal jurisdiction over an alleged violator may be not be possible. Md Second, serv-
ing process over the alleged violator may also prove impossible. Id. Third, it may be
hard to gather evidence outside of the United States due to secrecy and blocking laws,
and a dearth of witnesses willing to testify. Id. Fourth, the SEC may not be able to find
and seize ill-gotten gains. Id. Finally, differences in bookkeeping and disclosure re-
quirements between countries may render the actions of offshore violators nearly in-
comprehensible to SEC investigators. Id.
404. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text (discussing preliminary note 2
to Regulation S).
405. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,308 (May 2, 1990) (discussing
anti-evasion rule of Regulation S). Preliminary Note 2 allows the SEC to investigate and
sanction participants in a Regulation S transaction who are in technical compliance
with the rules if the Commissiom believes that the purpose of the transaction was to
evade the Securities Act registration requirements. Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-
230.904 prelim. n.2.
406. See supra note 401-05 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of enforc-
ing U.S. securities laws in context of international transactions).
407. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Westdon Holding & Investment, Inc.
et al., Litigation Release No. 13,263, 1992 WL 136673 (S.E.C.) (June 5, 1992); see supra
notes 315-21 and accompanying text (discussing facts and results of Westdon case).
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fiscally prohibitive to build a case against the violator.40  Conse-
quently, under Regulation S as currently configured, if the SEC
gains knowledge of illicitflowback of Regulation S securities into
the United States, Enforcement may be able to undertake pro-
ceedings against U.S. issuers who intentionally use Regulation S
to violate the Securities Act registration requirements.4° 9 The
Commission may also be able to sanction U.S. securities dealers
who make illegal redistributions possible. It will generally not,
however, be able to undertake enforcement proceedings against
offshore investors, who are the apparent source of many, if not
most, Regulation S violations. 410 Because the SEC has demon-
strated a tendency to accept injunctive relief for all but the most
egregious securities law violations,41' it is unlikely that the Com-
mission will be able to deter others, especially non-U.S. citizens,
from illegally using Regulation S in money-making schemes.
2. Private Remedies
In the case of Regulation S violations, the private remedy
granted by Section 12(1) of the Securities Act provides little pro-
tection against flowback for U.S. investors for a number of rea-
sons.41 2 First, the non-underwriter exemption does not require
the seller to inform his or her buyer that the securities are Regu-
lation S securities.41 3 Nor does Regulation S mandate disclosure
once the restricted period has expired.414 As a result, the buyer
may never know that the securities that he or she purchased
were unregistered Regulation S securities. Second, even if the
U.S. investor can prove a registration violation, his or her legal
408. See supra notes 401-06 and accompanying text (discussing constraints against
SEC enforcement of Regulation S).
409. See supra notes 106-12 (discussing investigatory and sanctioning powers of
SEC).
410. See supra notes 315-42 (discussing Westdon case and use of Regulation S shares
to cover short sales).
411. See UNrrED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 1993 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 1 (1994). The SEC brought 401 injunction and administrative proceedings in
1993. Id. In contrast, only sixty-seven criminal indictments for securities law violations
were obtained in 1993. Id.
412. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text (discussing private remedy
granted by Section 12(1) of Securities Act).
413. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing non-underwriter exemp-
tion at Section 4(1) of Securities Act).
414. See supra notes 214-34 and accompanying text (discussing compliance proce-
dures necessary to qualify for resale safe harbor protection under Regulation S).
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costs may render the suit worthless.41 5 Finally, under Section
12(1) a purchaser of unregistered securities may only sue the
person or entity from whom he or she bought the securities.41 6
Locating the seller, especially if he or she is a non-U.S. person,
may prove impossible. Because Section 12(1) does not provide
the unwitting U.S. purchaser of Regulation S securities with any
recourse to the issuer, Section 12(1) will generally provide no
remedy at all.41 7 Regulation S, therefore, denies U.S. investors
the protection to which they would otherwise be legally enti-
tled. 418
C. Recommendations for Diminishing the Flowback Problem419
The SEC must develop an offshore exemption regime that
promotes a rational balance between the U.S. government's de-
sire to provide free access to the international securities markets
for U.S. companies and the maintenance of adequate safeguards
against flowback.420 Regulation S does not currently provide
that balance. Neither SEC enforcement nor extant private reme-
dies can prevent unwanted flowback of Regulation S securi-
415. See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(1). Section 12(1) does not provide costs and
attorney's fees for the winning party. Id.; see supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text
(discussing private remedy granted by Section 12(1) of Securities Act).
416. Pinter v. Dahli, 486 U.S. 622, 647 (1988).
417. See supra note 105 and accomapanying text (discussing lack of issuer liability
to subsequent purchasers under § 12(1) of Securities Act).
418. See supra notes 73-86 (discussing underlying philosophy and purpose of Se-
curities Act); see also Fleming, supra note 267, at 13 (discussing danger of flowback to
U.S. investors). The market for Regulation S issues is so risky that unwary investors can
be easily cheated. Id.
419. Section I1(C) presupposes three propositions. First, the SEC has an
unwavering duty to protect U.S. investors in the United States against distributions of
non-exempt, unregistered securities. See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text
(discussing underlying purpose and philosophy of Securities Act). Roberta S. Karmel, a
former SEC commissioner and advocate of regulatory reform, argues that investor
protection remains extremely important because it promotes private investment in the
economy through securities purchases. KAlmEL, supra note 84, at 298. Second, the
SEC should not promulgate rules that give non-U.S. investors advantages that U.S.
investors do not have, such as the ability of offshore investors to use Regulation S stock
to cover U.S. short sales. See supra notes 326-44 and accompanying text (discussing use
of Regulation S stock to cover short sales on U.S. exchanges). Third, most detrimental
flowback of Regulation S shares will either comply with SEC rules or be untraceable. See
supra notes 401-11 and accompanying text (discussing constraints against SEC
enforcement of Regulation S).
420. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning behind
SEC'S adoption of Regulation S).
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ties.4 21 To solve the flowback problem, the SEC must structure
any future approach to regulation of offshore securities issuance
in a fashion that will use market forces to render the rules self-
enforcing. The SEC should, therefore, consider the following
suggestions for revising Regulation S in order to ensure that U.S.
investors receive the protection to which they are entitled under
the Securities Act. 422
1. Changes to Limit Flowback of Category Two Securities
Flowback of Category Two securities42 3 represents only a
limited threat to U.S. investors.424 Therefore, the SEC need not
take drastic measures to cut off the flow of those securities. A
few changes, however, are warranted. First, the SEC should con-
sider increasing the length of the Category Two holding pe-
riod.425 This step would discourage flowback by making it much
more difficult for international investors to use Regulation S
shares to cover U.S. short sales with Regulation S securities,426
thereby removing a major incentive for short-term speculators to
purchase Regulation S issues. This action would, however, de-
crease the liquidity of Category Two stocks, and possibly lead to a
tightening of the offshore market for the affected shares. 427 As a
421. See supra notes 395-418 and accompanying text (discussing constraints on use
of enforcement mechanisms and private remedies to combat flowback of Regulation S
securities).
422. See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text (discussing underlying purpose
and philosophy of Securities Act). Because investors in corporate debt tend to be so-
phisticated in comparison with most equity investors, and are therefore less likely to be
harmed by flowback, the suggestions below deal primarily with changes to the rules
affecting the offshore distribution of stock. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306,
18,318 (May 2, 1990) (discussing why SEC has placed greater transactional restrictions
on Category Three debt than on Category Three equity).
428. See supra notes 178-19 and accompanying text (discussing securities contained
in Category Two of issuer safe harbor).
424. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,316 (discussing SEC concerns
about flowback of Category Two securities). In the event of flowback, the information
available due to the Exchange Act reporting requirements should ensure investor pro-
tection. Id.
425. See Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c) (2) (iii) (1994). Currently, the hold-
ing period is 40 days. Id.; see supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing re-
stricted period imposed for Category Two offers and sales).
426. See supra notes 326-44 and accompanying text (discussing use of Regulation S
stock to cover short sales on U.S. exchanges).
427. See BOWE, supra note 48, at 893 (discussing concept of liquidity). Investors
who need to sell assets on short notice may not include illiquid assets in their portfolio.
Id.
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result, U.S. issuers may have to increase the discount to U.S. mar-
ket price given to offshore investors. 28 If the issuer is a major
corporation whose shares are in demand, however, lengthening
the Category Two holding period should not signifcantly hinder
the company's ability to issue offshore.
The second revision the SEC should consider is the imposi-
tion of restrictions on the size of the discount to U.S. market
price at which Regulation S securities can be issued.429 This limi-
tation would affect the market for the securities in a similar fash-
ion to the extension of the restricted period.4-0  Because this
rule would require the SEC to interfere directly in the operation
of the market, U.S. corporations and the financial community
would almost certainly adamantly oppose this approach to the
problem.
Finally, in the interest of promoting equal access to material
information for both U.S. and offshore investors, Regulation S
should be revised to require that reporting U.S. issuers an-
nounce Regulation S offerings in the United States prior to the
commencement of all offshore offerings.431 Currently, Regula-
tion S issuers may disclose the terms of an offer in the United
States without violating the regulation's general4 32 and offer-
ing4 3  restrictions, but they are not required to do So. 4
Mandatory announcements of Regulation S distributions prior
to the offer and sale will not place U.S. issuers in a worse finan-
428. See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text (discussing effect of safe har-
bor transactional restrictions on pricing of Regulation S issues).
429. See supra notes 326-44 and accompanying text (discussing use of Regulation S
stock to cover short sales on U.S. exchanges).
430. See supra notes 426-28 and accompanying text (discussing anticipated results
of lengthening Category Two restricted period).
431. See supra notes 326-34 and accompanying text (discussing potential effect of
failure to announce Regulation S offering on U.S. market price).
432. 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(a)-(b); see supra notes 166-74 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing general restrictions of Regulation S safe harbors).
433. 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(h); see supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing offering restrictions imposed on Regulation S issuers).
434. Simplification of Registration and Reporting Requirements for Foreign Com-
panies; Safe Harbors for Public Announcements of Unregistered Offerings and Broker-
Dealer Research Reports, Securities Act Release No. 7053 (Apr. 19, 1994). Issuers may
now announce Regulation S sales in the United States as long as the announcement
explicitly states thatthe securities have not been offered or sold in the United States
and will not be offered or sold in the United States. Id. The announcement may only
contain very limited information, including the name of the issuer, and the basic terms
of the issue. Id.
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cial position than if they did not announce. 43 5 Furthermore, like
the results of the previous suggestions, mandatory announce-
ments will increase the efficiency of the markets, decrease the
price of the shares on the domestic exchanges prior to issue, and
preclude offshore investors from using Regulation S shares to
unfairly cover short sales.
2. Changes to End the Flowback of Category Three Securities
Companies that are not subject to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 need not comply with the SEC's continuing disclo-
sure requirements.436 As a result, U.S. investors are unlikely to
have access to information concerning Category Three securi-
ties.43 7  Accordingly, U.S. investors need significantly greater
protection against flowback of Category Three securities than
they do against flowback of Category Two securities.438 Whereas
the preceding proposals are designed to limit flowback, the fol-
lowing suggestions are designed to completely cut off flowback
for the length of time necessary to ensure that the offshore pur-
chaser assumes the economic risk inherent in his or her invest-
ment.
43 9
To end injurious flowback of Category Three securities," 0
the SEC should first increase the length of the Category Three
equity holding period from its current length of one year to two
years.4 1 The SEC, in Rule 144,42 has already determined that
two years is a sufficient time to ensure that the primary offering
purchaser, rather than the U.S. purchaser to whom he or she
435. See generally Myron Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution versus Price
Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45J. Bus. 179 (1972) (discussing
pricing effects of large offerings of stock by reporting companies).
436. See Securities Exchange Act § 12(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) (discussing which types of corporations must register securities with SEC).
437. See supra notes 183, 198-99 and accompanying text (discussing differing levels
of information available concerning Category Three versus Category Two issuers).
438. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,318 (May 2, 1990) (discussing
why restrictions on Category Three securities are greater than those on Category Two
Securities). ,
439. See Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 prelim. n. (1994) (discussing purpose of
two-year restricted period on resales of privately placed securities).
440. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing securities contained in
Category Three of issuer safe harbor).
441. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text (discussing restricted periods
for Category Three securities).
442. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144.
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resells, accepts the risk of issuer insolvency." 5 Extending the re-
stricted period will, therefore, have two positive results. It will
force offshore investors in Regulation S stock to hold their
shares for the long-term," and it will bring Regulation S into
line with the Rule 144 restricted holding periods on resales of
shares bought through U.S. private placements." 5 Even though
a two-year holding period is likely to reduce both the size of the
market for the Category Three shares and the primary offering
price,"16 the lack of availability of information about Category
Three corporations makes such a restrictive rule necessary.4 47
As a second step, the Commission should mandate that the
identification legend,"8 currently required to be placed on all
Category Three securities during the restricted period, remain
on the shares until some point after they have been validly resold
in the United States under a resale exemption." 9 Furthermore,
the SEC should impose a new requirement that either issuers or
offshore purchasers of Regulation S shares report resales to the
Commision regardless of whether the Regulation S restricted pe-
riod has expired. These actions will enable the SEC to more eas-
ily trace the flow of unregistered Regulation S stock, and thereby
prevent unlawful flowback of such securities into the United
States. 450
Third, the SEC should recommend to the U.S. Congress
that it expand the scope of the Section 12(1) private remedy,451
443. IM § 230.144(d); see id. § 230.144 prelim. n. (discussing philosophy underly-
ing Rule 144).
444. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing, requirement that all
Category Three issuers agree by contract with purchaser that they will not transfer se-
curities in violation of Regulation S).
445. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144; see supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text (discussing
private placement procedures required by SEC Rule 144).
446. See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text (discussing effect of safe har-
bor transactional restrictions on pricing of, and market for, Regulation S issues).
447. See Adopting Release, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,318 (May 2, 1990) (discussing
reasons why current restrictions on Category Three equity are higher than those im-
posed on Category Two equity).
448. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (discussing identification legend
required on Category Three equity securities).
449. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing statutory exemptions
from registration).
450. See supra notes 395-418 and accompanying text (discussing constraints on use
of enforcement mechanisms and private remedies to combat flowback of Regulation S
securities).
451. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see
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under rules prescribed by the SEC, to allow rescission by inves-
tors in the United States against issuers who distribute on the
offshore markets, regardless of whether the purchaser is in priv-
ity with the issuer.45 2 The SEC could then grant unwitting U.S.
purchasers of Regulation S securities the right to rescind against
the issuer at the purchase price, or fair market value on the date
of purchase, for a certain period of time after the securities ini-
tially flowed back.455 This rule would place the burden of ensur-
ing that flowback did not occur on Category Three issuers in-
stead of the SEC. 454 As a result, this rule would give substantial
protection to U.S. investors, while at the same time, due to the
potential costs involved, discourage the use of the Regulation S
facility by companies in poor financial shape. This method of
flowback limitation is particularly appropriate because it works
on market principles. 45 5 Issuing corporations could transfer
much of the risks of liability by contracting with the offshore in-
vestors who purchased the shares in the primary Regulation S
offering for indemnification in the event that those securities
were sold in the United States prior to the expiration of the lia-
bility period. This contractual obligation would, in turn, provide
an additional disincentive for offshore investors to engage in ac-
tivities that could lead to flowback during the restricted period.
This rule would not, however, shut off the international markets
to unregistered companies for which the SEC has a legitimate
interest in allowing access - namely, financially-sound, non-re-
porting U.S. companies that either cannot afford to make a pub-
lic offering, or have chosen not to do so for other reasons.
Finally, after taking the preceding steps, the SEC should
eliminate Preliminary Note 2,456 in order to provide greater cer-
tainty for U.S. corporations and offshore investors who abide by
the amended rules of Regulation S. Preliminary Note 2 will no
supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text (discussing private remedy granted by Sec-
tion 12(1) of the Securities Act).
452. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (discussing limits on scope of
rescission right granted under section 12(1) of Securities Act).
453. See Securities Act of 1933 Act § 12(1) (discussing current right of rescission).
454. See supra note 180 and accomapnying text (discussing securities contained by
Category Three).
455. See Grundfest, supra note 114, at 7-10 (discussing why SEC should apply mar-
ket principles to securities regulation).
456. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text (discussing Preliminary Note 2
to Regulation S).
19951
868 FORDHAMINTERiIATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:806
longer be necessary because the combination of longer re-
stricted periods, mandatory announcements, and an effective
private remedy will give U.S. citizens and residents reasonable
protection against flowback, while still enabling U.S. corpora-
tions to compete for offshore capital.457 Furthermore, these
changes will reduce the amount of scarce enforcement resources
that the SEC will have to expend in the future to monitor off-
shore transactions.458
Flowback of Category Three securities poses a great threat
to the continuing effectiveness of U.S. securities registration re-
quirements. 45 9 The SEC must, therefore, carefully monitor
whether the revisions it makes to Regulation S effectively reduce
the problem. Over the next few years, the Commission must de-
termine whether maintaining open access to international mar-
kets for non-reporting U.S. corporations is truly possible within
the framework of the Securities Act.460 If the SEC finds that the
revisions are ineffective, the Commission should return to the
no-action procedures of Release 4708 for non-reporting compa-
nies.46'
CONCLUSION
Regulation S represents a noble attempt by the SEC to allow
almost unlimited access to offshore funding for U.S. corpora-
tions, while still maintaining an adequate shield against flowback
of unregistered securities into the hands of unsuspecting U.S.
investors. Intent, however, has not become reality. Due to the
fact that offshore issuers no longer find it necessary to request
no-action letters, Regulation S has impaired the SEC's ability to
track offshore distributions and to prevent flowback. After four
years in operation, the SEC must recognize that Regulation S, as
currently designed, provides too much room for use as an eva-
sive device, and not enough protection for investors. Although
457. See supra notes 263-75 and accompanying text (discussing importance of U.S.
corporate access to offshore capital).
458. See supra note 401 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on SEC en-
forcement resources).
459. See supra notes 290-97 (discussing why flowback undermines protective intent
of Securities Act).
460. See Asbill, supra note 251, at 8 (discussing need for SEC to determine whether
competitiveness in offshore markets should be major concern).
461. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text (discussing no-action letter pro-
cess under Release 4708).
REGULATION S
it is impossible to determine how much unwanted flowback has
occurred since 1990, there have been enough instances to war-
rant the SEC's attention. Because Regulation S provides a wide
conduit through which unregistered securities can easily make
their way back to the United States without SEC knowledge, it
poses a grave danger to the continuing efficacy of U.S. securities
registration law. In order to prevent further leaks in the Securi-
ties Act's protective wall, the SEC should adopt the stricter rules
set forth above. These changes will restrain unhealthy issuers,
but can be made without any undue reduction in market entry
for the financially-sound U.S. corporations that Regulation S was
originally meant to aid. By providing more definitive rules, the
SEC will not only remedy the flowback problem, but will also
enable issuers to rely on Regulation S without fear that the SEC
might accuse them of scheming to avoid registration. As a re-
sult, the SEC will have taken appropriate steps to provide the
balance between protection from flowback and access to the off-
shore markets required to make Regulation S work in the man-
ner that the SEC originally intended.
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